Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space by Hui Zhang & Pavel Podvig

Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang
Russian and Chinese
Responses to U.S.
Military Plans in Space
© 2008 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 0-87724-068-X
The views expressed in this volume are those held by each contributor
and are not necessarily those of the Officers and Fellows of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Please direct inquiries to:
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
136 Irving Street
Cambridge, MA 02138-1996
Telephone: (617) 576-5000
Fax: (617) 576-5050
Email: aaas@amacad.org
Visit our website at www.amacad.org
Contents
v P R E FA C E
v i i A C R ON YMS
1 C H A P T E R 1
Russia and Military Uses of Space
Pavel Podvig
3 1 C H A P T E R 2
Chinese Perspectives on SpaceWeapons
Hui Zhang
7 9 C O N T R I B U T O R S

PREFACE v
Preface
In recent years, Russia and China have urged the negotiation of an interna-
tional treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States has
responded by insisting that existing treaties and rules governing the use of
space are sufficient. The standoff has produced a six-year deadlock in Geneva
at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, but the parties have not
been inactive. Russia and China have much to lose if the United States were
to pursue the programs laid out in its planning documents. This makes prob-
able the eventual formulation of responses that are adverse to a broad range
of U.S. interests in space. The Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 was
prelude to an unfolding drama in which the main act is still subject to revi-
sion. If the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space,
how will China and Russia respond, and what will the broader implications
for international security be?
The American Academy called upon two scholars to further elucidate
answers to these questions and to discuss the consequences of U.S. military
plans for space. Pavel Podvig, a research associate at the Center for Inter-
national Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and former
researcher at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, discusses pos-
sible Russian responses, given their current capabilities and strategic outlook.
Hui Zhang, a research associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment at Harvard University, considers Chinese responses.
Each scholar suggests that introducing weapons into space will have neg-
ative consequences for nuclear proliferation and international security. As
Podvig points out, Russia’s main concern is likely to be maintaining strategic
parity with the United States. This parity will be destroyed by the deploy-
ment of weapons in space, making a response from Russia likely. Podvig
writes, “Russia does not have many options for the development of its own
weapon systems in space or for its reaction to the development of this capa-
bility by other countries. . . . However, this does not mean that there will be
no reaction.” He suggests that Russia will be more likely to undertake other
countermeasures such as extending the life of its ballistic missiles, measures
that are “the most significant and dangerous global effects of new military
developments, whether missile defense or space-based weapons.”
Zhang arrives at similar conclusions. He describes how U.S. plans will
negatively affect peaceful uses of outer space, disrupting current civilian and
commercial initiatives, but focuses on a much greater concern among
Chinese officials—that actions by the United States in space will result in a
loss of strategic nuclear parity. China’s options for response, as detailed by
Zhang, include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against mis-
sile defense, developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China’s commit-
ments on arms control. Thus introducing weapons into space would destabi-
lize the already vulnerable international non-proliferation regime. Zhang
concludes, “U.S. space weaponization plans would have potentially disas-
trous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer space.
This would not benefit any country’s security interests.”
These papers are part of the American Academy’s “Reconsidering the
Rules of Space” project. The project examines the implications of U.S. policy
in space from a variety of perspectives, and considers the international rules
and principles needed for protecting a long-term balance of commercial, mili-
tary, and scientific activities in space. The project is producing a series of
papers, intended to inform public discussion of legitimate uses of space, and
induce a further examination of U.S. official plans and policies in space.
Other papers consider the physical laws governing the pursuit of security in
space (spring 2005), challenges posed to the United States space program by
current policies (spring 2005), and the possible elements of a more compre-
hensive space security system (forthcoming).
In May 2002, the American Academy convened a workshop on Chinese
Perceptions of U.S. Space Plans to support Hui Zhang’s work on his essay.
Pavel Podvig’s essay was reviewed at a workshop at the University of
Maryland in January 2005. We join the authors in thanking the participants in
these workshops for their participation and insights.
We also thank five anonymous reviewers for their comments on the
papers. We acknowledge the excellent work of Helen Curry, Phyllis Bendell,
and Anne Read in producing this report. We are, most of all, grateful to the
authors for applying their knowledge and experience to these important
issues.
The Rules of Space project is supported by a generous grant from the
Carnegie Corporation of New York. We thank the Carnegie Corporation for
its support and Patricia Nicholas for her assistance.
John Steinbruner Carl Kaysen Martin Malin
University of Maryland Massachusetts Institute American Academy
of Technology of Arts and Sciences
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Acronyms
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)
ASAT anti-satellite (weapons)
BMD ballistic missile defense
CD UN Conference on Disarmament
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DEW directed energy weapon
FEL free-electron lasers
FMCT Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
GEO geosynchronous orbit
GMD ground-based midcourse defense
GPS Global Positioning System
GUKOS Main Space Systems Directorate
HEL high-energy laser
HEO highly elliptical orbit
HPM high-powered microwave
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
KEW kinetic energy weapon
LEO low Earth orbit
MDA Missile Defense Agency
MEO medium Earth orbit
MRV multiple reentry vehicle
MIRV multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NFIRE Near Field Infrared Experiment (satellite)
NPR Nuclear Posture Review
OKIK stationary control and measurement complex
OST Outer Space Treaty
PAROS prevention of an arms race in outer space
PRC People’s Republic of China
SBI space-based interceptor
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SBIRS space-based infrared system
SBL space-based laser
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
THAAD Theater High Altitude Area Defense
UNKS United Space Systems Directorate
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C H A P T E R 1
Russia and Military
Uses of Space
PAVEL PODV IG
Russia is one of the few countries to carry out a full range of activities in
space. The Russian government supports a number of space programs, from
manned flights to civilian and military communication, navigation, and satel-
lite-imagery systems. Russia has at its disposal launchers and launch facilities
that can deliver a range of payloads to almost any orbit. These capabilities
make Russia an important actor in all developments related to military uses
of space, especially those related to the weaponization of space.
Russia also has an important role in the future development of space be-
cause it remains a nuclear state with sizable offensive strategic nuclear forces.
Although the relationship between Russia and the United States—as well as
the other nuclear states—no longer has the adversarial nature that character-
ized it during the cold war, an expansion of U.S. military capabilities in space
might affect Russia’s security calculations and force its government to take
measures that would protect Russia’s strategic status vis-à-vis the United
States.
Russia is capable of carrying out its own military space program. Despite
the setbacks of the last decade, during which all Russian military programs
suffered due to lack of adequate funding, recent steps of the Russian leader-
ship indicate their intention to expand the military space program. Although
it is not clear whether Russia could maintain its military presence in space so
as to successfully compete with the United States, an expansion of the mili-
tary space program would be an important benchmark and would certainly
affect U.S. military policies.
All of these factors would certainly come into play if the United States
decided to proceed with development and operational deployment of space-
based weapon systems. There is little doubt that Russia would be compelled
to respond. The exact nature of the response, however, is much less clear. On
one hand, the factors described above give some reason to believe that Russia
has the capability to mount a strong and potentially destabilizing response to
U.S. space-weapon programs. On the other hand, recent history suggests that
Russia’s reaction might be quite restrained, as it was when the United States
withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Several factors will determine Russia’s response: the overall context of the
U.S.-Russian relationship, which will guide Russia’s evaluation of the threat
that U.S. programs pose to its security; its calculation of the kind of response
warranted; and the ability of the Russian military and military industry to
undertake the measures required for such a response.
WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE IN RUSSIA’S MILITARY THINKING
Russian military leaders and civilian experts have closely analyzed discussions
within the United States about military uses of space, as well as the doctrinal
documents of the U.S. military. These analyses have heightened concern in
Russia about the effects that the development of space-based military systems
might have on the U.S.-Russian military balance. Russians see the develop-
ment of military space systems by the United States as evidence of a growing
gap between military capabilities of the two countries. This gap challenges
the condition of strategic parity that Russia still believes to be the underlying
principle of its relationship with the United States.1
Before considering specific issues that have drawn the attention of the
Russian military, I should note that, at this moment, the issues in question are
primarily U.S. research projects on the military use of space and not develop-
ment or deployment programs. Although some U.S. research projects are very
ambitious, there are no specific plans for the United States to deploy weapon
systems in space. This uncertainty about the actual plans of the U.S. military
gives observers in Russia (as well as elsewhere) room for a wide range of
expectations and encourages the consideration of worst-case scenarios.
Russia’s reaction to the potential weaponization of space should also be
considered in the context of the current U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.
From the Russian perspective, the current situation is one of strategic parity,
where the United States is unlikely to be able to gain unilateral military ad-
vantage that would undermine the retaliatory potential of the Russian strate-
gic forces. It is usually assumed that various technological developments
would have the potential to jeopardize the existing strategic balance. Until
recently, missile defense dominated the discussion in Russia on technological
developments of this kind. Now the emphasis has shifted, and although mis-
sile defense still figures prominently, it is usually considered just one of many
potentially destabilizing U.S. programs. As with missile defense, it is widely
believed that deployment of weapons in space will open a way for the balance
currently secured by the offensive strategic forces to be undermined.2
Specific conflict scenarios, considered in the context of space weaponiza-
tion, can be categorized according to the goals of a conflict and the role that
space-based systems could play. Given the very important status that Russia
assigns to its strategic nuclear forces, the developments it considers most
threatening usually involve an attack intended to undermine Russia’s retalia-
tory potential. This includes direct attacks on launchers, command and con-
trol centers, communication links, and other components of the strategic
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infrastructure.3 However, because it is recognized that the probability of a
targeted attack on nuclear forces is essentially zero, analyses of potential threats
often consider other possibilities that are believed to be more likely. One sce-
nario of this kind would include a standoff strike with conventional weapons.
The strike would attack civilian and military infrastructure, not targeting
strategic nuclear forces directly but nevertheless making nuclear retaliatory
strike impossible.4
Most Russian writings on this subject accept that military systems deployed
in space would play a key role in any future conflict, regardless of the specific
scenario. The most alarmist view, expressed by some Russian analysts, is that
space will be used for the deployment of “strike weapons” able to attack tar-
gets on the ground. According to this view, space would give a decisive ad-
vantage to an attacker, allowing an adversary to launch a highly coordinated
attack on Russia’s strategic forces.5 It should be noted that in this context,
missile-defense systems are usually considered an important component of
the “space strike” force even though they may not have space-based compo-
nents. It is assumed that missile-defense systems would operate in coordina-
tion with the strike force to further weaken Russia’s retaliatory potential.
Although “space strike” weapons have a prominent place in the ongoing
discussion in Russia about the military use of space, attention is also paid to
the systems that support military operations on the ground. The most impor-
tant of these are the systems that provide the reconnaissance, targeting, and
navigation information that allow an attack to be conducted from a distance
and to use flexible and accurate targeting. The Global Positioning System
(GPS) navigation system and optical and electronic reconnaissance and com-
munication satellites are among the currently deployed systems of this kind.
It is correctly assumed that the number of these systems will grow with
improvements in their technical characteristics and with their increased abili-
ty to operate as part of an extensive and well-coordinated network. A capabil-
ity of this kind would introduce new uses of military force, and it is not yet
understood how these would affect Russia’s reliance on the strategic nuclear
force that exists today. The resulting uncertainty is one of the reasons the
Russian military is wary of the continued militarization of space, as it is
unclear if Russia would be able to deal with the new situation.
Assessment of the threats that space-based military systems might pose
is only one part of the discussion of this subject within the Russian military.
The discussion also addresses the question of how to respond to these threats
and how the Russian military should adapt to the growing role of space sys-
tems in military operations.
3. Sergey Brezkun, “Natsionalnaya prerogativa,” VPK, no. 8 (75), March 2–15, 2005; Radmir
Smirnov, “Zvezdnyye voiny: novaya versiya,” NVO NG, October 15, 2004.
4. The model on which scenarios of this kind are based is the NATO bombing campaign in
Serbia in 1999.
5. This kind of thinking directly echoes the one that dominated in the early stages of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) debate—the Soviet Union considered “space strike
weapons” to be the most threatening aspect of the program at that time.
Because the threat is seen largely as a threat to strategic assets—strategic
forces, command and control systems, and key objects of the civilian and mil-
itary infrastructure—responses are inevitably discussed through the frame of
strategic-defense options. This approach draws heavily on the Soviet tradi-
tion of considering strategic defense as a distinct mission; until a reform in
1997, this mission was assigned to Air Defense Forces, a separate service with-
in the Soviet and later the Russian military.
A series of reforms in recent years subordinated the air-defense compo-
nent of the service to the Air Forces and transferred space-related branches—
early-warning systems, space surveillance, and missile defense—to the Space
Forces. This transformation remains a contentious point in Russia, and many
analysts argue that defense in airspace and in outer space should be consid-
ered together and advocate an organizational reform that would facilitate
integration between various defense systems.6 Defense officials express the
point of view that although integration is indeed essential, it does not neces-
sarily require further organizational changes.7
The degree to which defending airspace and defending outer space are
considered to be part of a single mission varies, but most experts agree that
defenses are, at the very least, united by the strategic nature of any threat that
they would have to counter. As a result, some strong parallels between air and
space defense are drawn, and it is in this context that experts most often men-
tion the need to counter space-based assets of the attacker.8 In discussions of
this possibility, little distinction is made between “strike weapons” in space
and support systems like navigation or communication. This is understand-
able, as all these systems are assumed to be highly integrated.9
Overall, although its leaders rarely spell out the belief explicitly, the
Russian military seems to accept the view that anti-satellite systems may have
a legitimate role in future conflicts. Characteristically, while advancing a
diplomatic initiative to ban space-based weapon systems, Russia also under-
scores that anti-satellite systems not based in space should be excluded from
this ban.10 However, Russia has no specific plans for anti-satellites systems.
To summarize, discussion in Russia of the weaponization of space and
related issues recognizes the increasing role of space-based systems in military
operations. This development is usually considered a threat, mainly because it
has the potential to undermine the existing strategic balance and weaken
Russia’s status as a major power. However, because this threat has not yet
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6. Vyacheslav Baskakov, “Kosmicheskiye sily kak garantiya oborony strany,” NVO NG,
October 7, 2004.
7. Aleksandr Rukshin (Chief, Operational Directorate of the General Staff), “Air and Space
Defense,” VPK, no. 15, December 17–23, 2003.
8. G. P. Kupriyanov, “Osnovnyye tendentsii razvitiya form vooruzhennoy borby v voz-
dushno-kosmicheskoy sfere,” Voyennaya mysl, no. 1 (2005).
9. Vladimir Slipchenko, “Reforma bez kotoroy ne oboitis,” VPK, no. 48 (65), December
15–21, 2004.
10. Geoff Fein, “Russian Federation Seeks Ban On Space-BasedWeapons,”Defense Daily,
February 9, 2005.
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materialized, Russia’s response is discussed only in very general terms. On the
balance, the prevailing view in Russia is that there is more to lose than gain
from the weaponization of space, and so the official Russian position oppos-
es the development and deployment of space-based weapons.
This does not mean that Russia opposes any military use of space. On the
contrary, military and political leaders emphasize the importance of develop-
ing systems that would support military operations from space—navigation,
communication, and reconnaissance.11 Deployment of these systems would
eventually require a means of protecting them, which could in theory bring
Russia to reconsider its current opposition to space weapons.12
To understand whether Russia could indeed change its position on the
weaponization of space, we need to go beyond official statements and discus-
sion among Russian military experts. The course of the military space program
in Russia will be determined primarily by the availability of the resources re-
quired to support the program and by the ability of the industry and the mili-
tary to manage development projects for the military use of space.
EXISTING MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS
Virtually all active Russian military space programs were initiated in the
Soviet Union. Even in cases where the first launch was conducted after the
breakup of the Soviet Union, research and development had been largely
completed before that time. During the 1990s, the primary challenges that
Russia faced were to preserve the military programs that it had inherited and
to prevent deterioration of the infrastructure that supported space opera-
tions. To a certain degree, Russia has been successful in meeting these chal-
lenges, managing to keep most of its military space systems in operation.
However, as discussed below, in most cases the systems in question have
operated at a level that does not provide full operational capability and have
relied on equipment manufactured before the breakup of the Soviet Union.
As part of its extensive space program, the Soviet Union developed and
deployed military space-based systems in virtually all categories—from mis-
sile early warning to reconnaissance, from communication to satellite naviga-
tion. The extent to which these systems are supported today indicates in part
the priorities of the Russian armed forces, although one must take into ac-
count that, in reality, support depends on a number of factors, including the
real operational needs of the armed forces, the ability to manufacture space-
craft and launchers in Russia, and the interests of the space industry. These
factors make determining the priorities of the armed forces more difficult,
but still allow conclusions to be drawn about the direction of development
in the Russian military space program.
As of 2007, Russia maintained active military space programs in five
areas—early warning, optical reconnaissance, communication, navigation,
and signal intelligence.
11. Anatoly Perminov, “Voyennyy kosmos Rossii,” Voyennaya mysl, no. 1 (2004).
12. Vladimir Slipchenko, “Reforma bez kotoroy ne oboitis.”
Early-Warning Satellites
Sensors deployed in space are traditionally considered a vital component of
an early-warning system if the system is to provide timely warning of a mis-
sile attack. Because sensors in space can be made capable of detecting ballistic
missiles almost immediately after launch, these sensors can provide the maxi-
mum possible warning time—up to 30 minutes in the case of land-based in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Soviet Union began develop-
ment of its space-based early-warning system in 1971 and was able to deploy
it by 1982.13 Early-warning satellites complement a network of radar stations
deployed along the periphery of the Soviet territory.
In its full configuration, the space-based early-warning system, known
as Oko or US-KS, consists of up to nine satellites on highly elliptical orbits
(HEO) and one satellite on a geostationary orbit (GEO). This configuration
allows continuous coverage of ICBM bases on U.S. territory. Submarine
patrol areas in the ocean are not covered by this system, so it cannot detect
launches of sea-based ballistic missiles.
To maintain continuous coverage of U.S. ICBM bases, the system needs at
least four satellites on HEO. Filling all nine HEO slots in the constellation and
adding a GEO satellite increases the reliability of launch detection, but does
not extend coverage in a substantial way.14 Until the mid-1990s, Russia man-
aged to maintain the Oko system in almost full capacity and had the capabili-
ty to reliably detect launches of U.S. land-based missiles. This required about
three launches per year to replenish the constellation. Russia was able to con-
duct these launches despite the serious financial difficulties of that period. The
capabilities of the system began deteriorating between 1997 and 1998, after a
6 RUSSIAN AND CHINESE RESPONSES TO U.S. MILITARY PLANS IN SPACE
13. Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System,”
Science and Global Security, vol. 10, no. 1 (2002): 21–60.
14. Ibid.
Table 1: Recent Launches of Early-Warning Satellites
NORAD
number
Launch
date
Inclination
(degrees)
Perigee
(km)
Apogee
(km)
End of
operation
Comment
US-KS/Oko
Cosmos-2345 24894 08/14/97 3.6 35118 36466 02/1999 GEO
Cosmos-2351 25327 05/07/98 64.6 3210 37200 05/2001 HEO
Cosmos-2368 26042 12/27/99 63.1 2394 37977 12/2002 HEO
Cosmos-2388 27409 04/02/02 64.3 490 39842 11/2006 HEO
Cosmos-2393 27613 12/24/02 63.0 879 39454 02/2007 HEO
Cosmos-2422 29260 07/21/06 62.9 860 39000 Active HEO
Cosmos-2430 32268 10/23/07 63.0 560 39200 Active HEO
US-KMO
Cosmos-2350 25315 04/29/98 2.1 35758 35808 06/1998 GEO
Cosmos-2379 26892 08/24/01 0.6 35770 35804 Active GEO, 12E
Cosmos-2397 27775 04/24/03 2.0 35545 35908 05/2003 GEO
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series of malfunctions caused premature termination of the operations of
some deployed satellites. By the end of 1999, the system had been reduced to
the minimum level of four satellites on HEOs.
The system suffered a further setback in May 2001, when a fire destroyed
its command and control center at Serpukhov-15 near Moscow. As a result of
the fire, Russia lost control over all four deployed satellites and for about four
months did not have the ability to detect missile launches from space.15 All
four satellites were eventually lost and have been replaced by two HEO satel-
lites, Cosmos-2388 and Cosmos-2393, and one GEO satellite, Cosmos-2379.
Since the end of 2002 until 2006, the system has operated in this configura-
tion, which theoretically allows continuous coverage of U.S. ICBM fields,
albeit with reduced reliability. In 2006 and 2007, two new satellites, Cosmos-
2422 and Cosmos-2430, joined the constellation, and two others—Cosmos-
2388 and Cosmos-2393—ended their operations.
Because the capabilities of the Oko/US-KS do not allow it to detect launch-
es from areas other than continental United States, the Soviet Union began
development of a new generation of early-warning satellites in the 1980s. The
new satellites were to be capable of detecting missiles against a background of
Earth’s cloud cover and were to be deployed both on highly elliptical and
geostationary orbits. This system was designated US-KMO.
The first early-warning satellite of the new generation was launched in
1991. By 2006, there had been six US-KMO satellite launches; the last was
Cosmos-2397, launched in April 2003.16 Only one of these satellites—
Cosmos-2379—is operational today. The program has been plagued by satel-
lite malfunctioning, which significiantly shortened satellites’ lifetimes. For
example, all but one of the US-KMO system launched since 1994 ended their
operations prematurely.17
Russia is currently working on a new space-based early-warning system,
known as EKS. Flight tests of satellites of the new system are expected to begin
in 2009.18
Optical Reconnaissance
Russia operates at least six different types of optical reconnaissance satellites,
which vary in their capabilities and missions from wide-area cartography to
detailed photography of specific areas of interest. As it is the case with other
systems, photoreconnaissance programs can be divided into legacy programs
that continue from the Soviet era and newer programs activated after 1992.
15. Ibid.
16. I. Safronov, “Moskva ustanovila nad mirom protivoraketnyy control,” Kommersant,
April 28, 2003.
17. K. Lantratov and E. Fedorov, “Otstavka kosmicheskogo naznacheniya,” Kommersant,
August 25, 2003.
18. “Ispytaniya novoy kosmicheskoi sistemy SPRN nachnutsya v 2009 godu,” Gazeta.ru,
August 20, 2007.
The older programs, which still constitute the core of Russia’s imaging
capability, are systems of the Yantar family. Three types of satellites are known
as Yantar: Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt, Yantar-4KS1 Neman, and Yantar-1KFT Kometa.
Although the spacecraft are quite different in their missions and capabilities,
they share design features as they were built around a common platform.
Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt is a photoreconnaissance satellite that produces
detailed imaging. It carries a camera and two capsules that allow it to return
exposed film to the earth during the mission. At the end of a flight, the space-
craft itself is returned to the ground, acting as a third reentry capsule. The
flight time of a spacecraft of this type is typically about 60 days, so the film is
returned at about 20-day intervals. Kobalt satellites have been deployed in
low-earth orbit, with an inclination of about 67 degrees and perigee and
apogee of about 170 km and 350 km respectively.
During the 1980s, when the Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt was the primary Soviet
reconnaissance satellite, the Soviet Union launched up to nine satellites of
this type annually to provide timely imaging data. As a rule, there was at least
one spacecraft of this type in orbit at any given time. By the end of 1990s, the
launch rate had dropped to one satellite every one or two years, and Russia
could no longer constantly keep an operational satellite in orbit, even though
duration of the mission was almost doubled to reach about four months.
As part of the Kobalt program, in 2004 the Space Forces launched the
Cosmos-2410 satellite, which was described as a reconnaissance satellite of a
new generation, Kobalt-M. The mission was not entirely successful—the
spacecraft completed its mission prematurely and was not recovered after
reentry. Nevertheless, the problems with the satellite appear to have been rela-
tively minor and the Space Forces announced plans to begin regular launches
of Kobalt-M satellites after 2006.19 The second launch took place in May 2006,
and the third in June 2007.
One of the most serious drawbacks of film-based reconnaissance satellites
is their inability to provide immediate data and their limited life span, which
is determined by the amount of film a satellite can carry on board. Photo-
electronic reconnaissance satellites have a clear advantage in these areas.
Soviet satellites of this type, which are known as Yantar-4KS1 Neman, trans-
mit imaging information electronically, using geostationary relay satellites
when necessary.
Regular launches of Neman satellites began in 1984. A mission would
usually last from six to eight months, after which the satellite would reenter
the atmosphere. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union launched one or two Neman
satellites each year, to have at least one operational spacecraft in orbit. The sit-
uation changed in the late 1990s; after 1995, there were only two launches of
Neman satellites—one in 1998 and one in 2000.
The third system of the Yantar family includes the Yantar-1KFT Kometa
topographic imaging satellites. These film-based satellites provide wide-area
8 RUSSIAN AND CHINESE RESPONSES TO U.S. MILITARY PLANS IN SPACE
19. I. Safronov, “Rossiiskiy voyennyi kosmos ischerpal sovetski zapas,” Kommersant,
November 12, 2005.
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imaging data for military as well as civilian purposes. These satellites began
operations in the early 1980s and were launched at a rate of about one satellite
annually, with nominal mission duration of about 45 days.
In addition to the Yantar systems described above, Russia is developing at
least three other photoreconnaissance satellite systems. Two of them use film-
based satellites—Orlets-1 Don and Orlets-2 Yenisey—and the other is based
on an electronic reconnaissance satellite, Arkon.
The distinguishing feature of Orlets-1 and Orlets-2 is the increased num-
ber of film capsules that can be returned to the ground during the satellite’s
mission. Orlets-1 has eight capsules and Orlets-2 is reported to have 22. In
addition, it is likely that the satellites’ optics systems allow them to take images
at a higher resolution than that achieved by the satellites of previous genera-
tions. Because the satellites rely on film for recording images, their lifespan is
relatively short—from 40 to 60 days.
Orlets-1 is an older program; satellites of this type have been in operation
since 1989. From 1989 to 1993, these satellites were launched annually, but
Table 2: Recent Launches of Optical Reconnaissance Satellites
NORAD
number
Launch
date
Inclination
(degrees)
Perigee
(km)
Apogee
(km)
End of
operation
Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt
Cosmos-2348 25095 12/15/97 67.1 176 370 04/14/98
Cosmos-2358 25373 06/24/98 67.1 167 334 10/22/98
Cosmos-2365 25889 08/18/99 67.1 166 342 12/15/99
Cosmos-2377 26775 05/29/01 67.1 176 382 10/10/01
Cosmos-2387 27382 02/25/02 67.1 176 369 06/27/02
Cosmos-2410 28396 09/24/04 67.1 175 368 01/09/05
Cosmos-2420 29111 05/03/06 67.1 180 360 07/19/06
Cosmos-2427 31595 06/07/07 67.1 180 360 08/23/07
Yantar-4KS1 Neman
Cosmos-2359 25376 06/25/98 64.9 240 302 07/12/99
Cosmos-2370 26354 05/03/00 64.8 240 300 05/04/01
Yantar-1KFT Kometa
Cosmos-2349 25167 02/17/98 70.4 228 286 04/02/98
Cosmos-2373 26552 09/29/00 70.4 265 285 11/13/00
Cosmos-2415 28841 09/02/05 64.8 207 307 10/16/05
Orlets-1 Don
Cosmos-2399 27856 08/12/03 64.9 205 326 11/24/03
Cosmos-2423 29402 09/14/06 64.9 175 340 11/14/06
Orlets-2 Yenisey
Cosmos-2372 26538 09/25/00 64.8 201 313 04/20/01
Arkon
Cosmos-2344 24827 06/06/97 63.4 1509 2748 10/1997
Cosmos-2392 27470 07/25/02 63.5 1507 1834 07/2003
after that there were only three launches, in 1997, 2003, and 2006. Cosmos-
2423 was the last satellite of this type.
Although the Orlets-2 program began in the late 1980s, the first launch of
a satellite of this type was conducted in 1994. That first flight, of Cosmos-
2290, lasted for more than seven months and appeared to be of an experimen-
tal nature. The next launch was conducted in 2000. As of 2007, it remains the
most recent launch of a satellite of this type. It appears that the Orlets-2 is still
largely an experimental program. Don and Yenisey satellites will be replaced
by satellites of a new type, known as Persona. Its first launch is expected in
2008.
Another optical reconnaissance program under development is known as
Arkon. Development of this system began in the mid-1980s, but it was not
before June 1996 that a satellite was ready for launch. The new satellite,
Cosmos-2344, was deployed in a relatively high orbit, with perigee of about
1500 km and apogee of about 2700 km. This is unusual for imaging satellites,
which tend to be deployed in lower orbits to get better spatial resolution.
The Cosmos-2344 transmitted imaging information to the ground control
center electronically, using geostationary relay satellites when necessary.
It is likely that one reason for the unusual choice of orbit was to facilitate
an extension of the satellite’s lifetime, which at high altitudes would be un-
affected by atmospheric drag. However, the actual lifetime of the satellites
proved to be fairly short. The first satellite ceased operations only four months
after launch because of a malfunction. The second—and so far the last—
launch of Arkon was conducted in July 2002. That satellite functioned for
over one year, after which it stopped operations, probably short of its intend-
ed operational lifespan.20
As this brief overview of the Russian optical reconnaissance programs
suggests, Russia does not have the capability to maintain continuous cover-
age of the Earth with its satellites. Moreover, even if all its satellites were
operational, Russia would have rather limited capability to obtain high-reso-
lution imaging data in a timely manner. New systems intended to provide
that capability still seem to be in experimental stages.
Naval Reconnaissance and Signal Intelligence
The Soviet Union invested considerable resources into development of a sys-
tem that would provide the capability to detect ships at sea and direct missiles
at them. The first version of this system began operating in the early 1970s. It
included satellites of two types: passive signal intelligence satellites, known as
US-P or EORSAT; and active radar surveillance satellites, US-A or RORSAT.
While the system has been in operation, the satellites and their mission pro-
files have undergone a number of modifications. Operations of the active sys-
tem, US-A, were discontinued in 1988, primarily due to concerns about the
nuclear reactors used to power the satellite systems. A modified version of the
US-P system, known as US-PU, is currently in operation.
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The US-PU/EORSAT system includes satellites that can track surface ships
by detecting their radio communications, radar emissions, etc. A full constel-
lation of these satellites includes three or four spacecraft deployed on circular
orbits with altitudes of about 400 km. A US-PU satellite usually stays in orbit
for about two years, after which it reenters the atmosphere. Until 1997,
Russia launched one or two satellites of this type every year to keep the sys-
tem operational. After 1997, however, the interval between launches increased
to almost two years; as a result, there has been no more than one working
satellite in orbit at any given time.
Table 3: Recent Launches of Signal Intelligence Satellites
NORAD
number
Launch
date
Inclination
(degrees)
Perigee
(km)
Apogee
(km)
End of
operation
US-PU/EORSAT
Cosmos-2347 25088 12/09/97 65 410 410 11/19/99
Cosmos-2367 26040 12/26/99 65 404 418 07/19/02
Cosmos-2383 27053 12/21/01 65 410 410 03/20/04
Cosmos-2405 28350 05/28/04 65 412 427 04/20/06
Cosmos-2421 29247 06/25/06 65 409 430 Active
Tselina-2
Cosmos-2333 24297 09/04/96 71 848 852
Cosmos-2360 25406 07/28/98 71 848 852
Cosmos-2369 26069 02/03/00 71 848 854
Cosmos-2406 28352 06/10/04 71 850 890
Cosmos-2428 31792 06/29/07 71 850 880
It was reported that the US-PU system would be discontinued, and Comos-
2383, which orbited from December 2001 to March 2004, was thought to be
the last satellite of this type. However, the Space Forces launched two more
satellites of the US-PU type after that. Still, the system is expected to be with-
drawn from service and replaced by a new-generation Liana system.
In addition to the US-P system, which was dedicated to the observation of
electronic signatures of surface ships, the Soviet Union deployed a number of
general-purpose signal intelligence and electronic reconnaissance systems, all
of the Tselina family. The first two generations of signal intelligence satellites,
Tselina-O and Tselina-D, were in operation until 1984 and 1994 respectively. The
system currently in operation is known as Tselina-2. Its development began in
the mid-1970s and the first spacecraft of this type was launched in 1984.
Tselina-2 satellites are deployed in relatively high circular orbits (altitude
about 850 km). A full Tselina-2 constellation consists of four satellites in four
orbital planes. Until the mid-1990s, Russia managed to maintain an almost
full constellation, but by early 2004 only one operational satellite remained in
orbit. In June 2004, the Space Forces launched a new satellite of the Tselina-2
type, and one more satellite was launched in 2007. 2007 was reported to be
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Table 4: Recent Launches of Navigation Satellites
NORAD
number
Launch
date
Inclination
(degrees)
Perigee
(km)
Apogee
(km)
End of
operation
Comment
Parus
Cosmos-2361 25590 12/24/98 82.9 969 1013
Cosmos-2366 25892 08/26/99 82.9 963 1013
Cosmos-2378 26818 06/08/01 82.9 963 1010
Cosmos-2389 27436 05/28/02 82.9 950 1017
Cosmos-2398 27818 06/04/03 82.9 950 1017
Cosmos-2407 28380 07/22/04 82.9 948 1004
Cosmos-2414 28523 01/20/05 82.9 917 960
Cosmos-2429 32052 09/11/07 83.0 970 1010
Glonass
Cosmos-2374 26566 10/13/00 64.8 19119 19128 Glonass 783
Cosmos-2375 26564 10/13/00 64.8 19119 19128 Glonass 787
Cosmos-2376 26565 10/13/00 64.8 19119 19128 Glonass 788
Cosmos-2380 26989 12/01/01 64.8 19119 19128 Glonass 790
Cosmos-2381 26988 12/01/01 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 789
Cosmos-2382 26987 12/01/01 64.8 19119 19128 Glonass 711
Cosmos-2394 27617 12/25/02 64.8 19119 19128 Glonass 791
Cosmos-2395 27619 12/25/02 64.8 19119 19128 Active Glonass 792
Cosmos-2396 27618 12/25/02 64.8 19119 19128 Glonass 793
Cosmos-2402 28113 12/10/03 64.8 19137 19137 Glonass 794
Cosmos-2403 28114 12/10/03 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 795
Cosmos-2404 28112 12/10/03 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 701
Cosmos-2411 28509 12/26/04 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 712
Cosmos-2412 28510 12/26/04 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 797
Cosmos-2413 28508 12/26/04 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 796
Cosmos-2417 28917 12/25/05 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 798
Cosmos-2418 28916 12/25/05 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 713
Cosmos-2419 28915 12/25/05 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 714
Cosmos-2424 29672 12/25/06 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 715
Cosmos-2425 29670 12/25/06 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 716
Cosmos-2426 29671 12/25/06 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass 717
Cosmos-2431 32277 10/26/07 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass-718
Cosmos-2432 32276 10/26/07 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass-719
Cosmos-2433 32275 10/26/07 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass-720
Cosmos-24?? 32393 12/25/07 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass-72?
Cosmos-24?? 32394 12/25/07 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass-72?
Cosmos-24?? 32395 12/25/07 64.8 19137 19137 Active Glonass-72?
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the last launch of a satellite of this type—like US-PU, Tselina-2 satellites are
expected to be replaced by the new Liana system. The first satellite of the new
type is expected to be launched in 2008.
Navigation Satellites
Two major military navigation systems are currently in use in Russia. The
first, known as Tsiklon or Parus, includes satellites in circular orbits with alti-
tudes of about 1000 km. The system provides accuracy of about 100 m. Ini-
tially developed as a military system, the system was later widely used for nav-
igation by Soviet (and now Russian) civilian ships. In recent years, Russia has
launched about one satellite per year, which is probably enough to keep the
system operational.
Another navigation system, known as Glonass, is the Soviet (now Rus-
sian) equivalent of the U.S. Navstar/GPS system. Like its U.S. counterpart, it
includes satellites deployed in semi-synchronous circular orbits with altitudes
of 20,000 km. There are differences in configuration—the Russian system
includes 24 satellites deployed in three orbital planes, as opposed to four
orbital planes for GPS. The accuracy provided by the Glonass system, assum-
ing that the full constellation is deployed, is comparable to that of GPS.
Deployment of Glonass satellites began in 1982, but the system did not
reach initial operational capability until 1989. After the breakup of the Soviet
Union, the system suffered from mismanagement and inadequate funding.
The Russian government tried several times to commercialize the system but
was unsuccessful. As a result, although the system is in operation, the number
of working satellites is rarely higher than ten. Consequently, the ability of the
system to provide accurate navigation information is very limited. Develop-
ment of the Glonass system is also held back by a lack of equipment that
would allow the Russian military and civilian users to take advantage of the
data supplied by the system.21
Despite these problems, Russia is determined to continue to operate the
Glonass system and launches about three satellites per year to replenish the
constellation. Russia is currently developing a new type of Glonass satellite,
known as Glonass-M, which will have a longer lifespan and therefore will
require fewer launches. The first Glosnass-M satellite was launched in De-
cember 2004. After the launches in 2007, 14 satellites in the constellation are
of the Glonass-M type. Six more are expected to be launched in 2008. Accord-
ing to the current plans, Russia will complete deployment of the constella-
tion of 24 satellites in 2008.
Communication Satellites
Three general categories of space-based communication systems are main-
tained by Russia—low Earth orbit relay satellites, satellites in HEO, and geo-
stationary satellites. Although most of these systems were developed with
21. Andrey Liscovich, “Global Navigation Satellite System: Problems and Prospects,”
Center for Arms Control Studies Working Paper, Dolgoprudny, 2004.
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Table 5: Recent Launches of Military Communication Satellites
NORAD
number
Launch
date
Inclination
(degrees)
Perigee
(km)
Apogee
(km)
End of
operation
Comment
Strela-3
Cosmos-2337 24725 02/14/97 82.6 1409 1409
Cosmos-2338 24726 02/14/97 82.6 1409 1409
Cosmos-2339 24727 02/14/97 82.6 1409 1409
Cosmos-2352 25363 06/16/98 82.6 1300 1870
Cosmos-2353 25364 06/16/98 82.6 1300 1870
Cosmos-2354 25365 06/16/98 82.6 1300 1870
Cosmos-2355 25366 06/16/98 82.6 1300 1870
Cosmos-2356 25367 06/16/98 82.6 1300 1870
Cosmos-2357 25368 06/16/98 82.6 1300 1870
Cosmos-2384 27055 12/28/01 82.5 1415 1447
Cosmos-2385 27056 12/28/01 82.5 1415 1447
Cosmos-2386 27057 12/28/01 82.5 1415 1447
Cosmos-2390 27464 07/08/02 82.5 1467 1507
Cosmos-2391 27465 07/08/02 82.5 1467 1507
Cosmos-2400 27868 08/19/03 82.5 1459 1502
Cosmos-2401 27869 08/19/03 82.5 1466 1501
Cosmos-2408 28419 09/23/04 82.5 1470 1517
Cosmos-2409 28420 09/23/04 82.5 1475 1517
Cosmos-2416 28909 12/21/05 82.5 1450 1470
Molniya-1
Molniya-1-90 24960 10/24/97 64.1 1117 39237
Molniya-1-91 25485 09/28/98 64.0 988 39372
Molniya-1-92 27707 04/19/03 63.3 586 39765
Molniya-1-93 28163 02/18/04 62.9 791 39563
Molniya-3
Molniya-3-49 25379 07/01/98 62.8 466 40770
Molniya-3-50 25847 07/08/99 62.5 472 40813
Molniya-3-51 26867 07/20/01 62.7 255 40811
Molniya-3-52 26970 10/25/01 62.9 646 40658
Raduga
Raduga 1-4 25642 02/28/99 3.6 35783 35787 11/2005 35E
Raduga 1-5 26477 08/28/00 1.2 35775 35792 Active 45E
Raduga 1-6 26936 10/06/01 0.4 35777 35795 03/2006 70E
Raduga 1-7 28194 03/27/04 1.2 35766 35804 Active 85E
Cosmos-2434 32373 12/09/07 1.0 35800 35800 Active 70E
Geizer
Cosmos-2371 26394 07/05/00 1.3 35770 35806 Active 80E
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military applications in mind, they or their modifications are also used for
civilian purposes.
The Strela-3 communication system, which includes satellites in low earth
orbits, was developed for the military intelligence. The satellites work in store-
dump mode: they receive information as they pass over the sender and trans-
mit it when they pass over the recipient. A full constellation includes 12 satel-
lites deployed in two orbital planes at altitudes of about 1400 km.
The system became operational in the late 1980s, replacing an earlier but
similar system. In addition to the military Strela-3 system, Russia began de-
ployment of its civilian counterpart, known as Gonets-D and Gonets-D1, in
1992. Satellites of this system are currently deployed in the same orbital planes
as military satellites and are also likely to be used for military applications.
Deployment of the Gonets/Strela-3 systems was interrupted from 1998 to
2001, as there were no launches of new satellites for more than three years (a
launch attempt in 2000 was unsuccessful due to launcher failure). In Decem-
ber 2001, launches resumed, and by the end of 2005 the Space Forces had
deployed fourteen new satellites, indicating Russia’s intention to continue
maintenance of these systems.
Two communication systems that include satellites on HEO are Molniya-1
and Molniya-3. The orbits used for deployment of these satellites, Molniya
orbits, are named after the satellites. An orbit of this type has a perigee of
400–1000 km and an apogee of about 40,000 km. A spacecraft that occupies
this orbit spends most of a revolution at the apogee (which in the case of the
Molniya satellites is located over the Russian territory), allowing it to provide
better coverage of the country than a geostationary satellite.
Molniya satellites are relay satellites for general-purpose military and civil-
ian communication. To maintain the constellations, Russia launches about
one satellite of each type annually. There have been some exceptions to this,
but the pattern of launch activity suggests that Russia will continue to main-
tain these systems. On December 24, 2006, Russia launched a Meridian com-
munication satellite (NORAD 29668), which is believed to be a follow-on to
satellites of the Molniya type.
Another class of relay systems includes satellites of two different types
deployed in GEO. Satellites of one type, Raduga-1/Globus-1, are used for gen-
eral-purpose communication and are reported to have secure channels for
communication between military leadership. Raduga-1 satellites are deployed
at four points on GEO over the Indian Ocean. The system has been in opera-
tion since 1989 and is maintained with regular launches.22
The second military communication system on GEO, Geizer, is used as a
relay for low earth orbit satellites, including imaging and communication
satellites. The satellites also appear to have spare bandwidth capacity that can
be used for civilian applications. Geizer satellites have operated since 1982. A
full constellation would include three satellites, but Russia has had only one
operational satellite of this type in orbit since 2000.
22. Yu. Zhuravin, “Na orbite—novaya Raduga,”Novosti kosmonavtiki, no. 10 (2000).
SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE
Launch Sites
By the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union had two primary space-launch
centers—Baykonur (also known as Tyuratam) in Kazakhstan and Plesetsk
near Arkhangelsk in northern Russia.23 The centers were Ministry of Defense
test sites and, along with space launch facilities, they included a number of
military installations used for tests of ICBMs. The Military Space Forces oper-
ated the centers with the participation of the Ministry of General Machine
Building, which had the responsibility for the Soviet space program.
Baykonur has always been the main space-launch site, from which all
launches of manned spacecraft and all launches into GEOs have occurred. The
unique role of the Baykonur site forced Russia to seek a leasing agreement
with Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The agreement as-
serts Kazakh sovereignty over the site and requires Russia to pay an annual
fee for its use. A January 2004 agreement extended the lease until 2050 and
made provisions for the development of joint Russian-Kazakh projects.24
The terms of the lease apparently allow the Russian armed forces to con-
tinue to use the site for military-related space and ballistic missile launches. At
the same time, Russia has sought ways to move all its military activity to sites
on the Russian territory, a stated long-term goal.25 In order to do so, Russia
has initiated construction of a new launch complex at the Plesetsk launch site,
built some launch facilities in Svobodnyy on the Far East. It also commis-
sioned a new launch facility at the ICBM base at Dombarovsky. The goal is to
transfer all military launches to sites on Russian territory. Baykonur will most
likely continue as a primary launch site for manned flights and for scientific
and commercial activity.
Baykonur. The Baykonur space-launch site, established in 1955, is located
in Kzyl-Orda region of Kazakhstan, at the latitude of 46º North and longi-
tude of 63º40’ East. The northern location of the site limits the range of incli-
nation of orbits that satellites can be inserted into, as no orbits with inclina-
tions less than 46 degrees are possible. The location also imposes a penalty in
payload weight as compared to launch sites closer to the equator.
The launch-site territory contains a number of launch complexes, each
designed to support launches (and rocket and satellite preparation) of a spe-
cific launcher type. Each complex includes one or two launch pads (or silos).
Two launch complexes with one launch pad each—launch complexes
Nos. 1 and 31—support launches of the so-called R-7 family, which includes
space launchers based on the R-7 ICBM design. Among these are Vostok, Vos-
khod, and Soyuz launchers used for the manned space program, Molniya
16 RUSSIAN AND CHINESE RESPONSES TO U.S. MILITARY PLANS IN SPACE
23. Another test site used for launching small spacecraft, Kapustin Yar in Orenburg oblast,
has not been used in this capacity for military purposes since 1988. In 1999, the site was
used for a commercial launch and may be used in auxiliary role in the future.
24. Agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia on further development of cooperation in
effective operation of Baykonur, Astana, January 4, 2002.
25. A. Bogatyrev, “Severnye starty,” Krasnaya zvezda, October 30, 2003.
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launchers used for launching satellites into HEO, and modified versions of
these launchers used for various missions. The launchers of the R-7-family can
deliver a payload of up to eight metric tons into a low earth orbit, depending
on configuration.
Launch complexes 81 and 200 service the Proton heavy launcher. Each
complex has two launch pads. Proton can lift up to about a twenty-ton pay-
load into a low earth orbit and about five metric tons into a geosynchronous
orbit. It has the greatest lifting capability of Russian space launchers and is
used for all launches of geostationary satellites. Baykonur is the only launch
site that has Proton launch facilities.
Another dedicated space-launch complex at Baykonur is launch complex
45, which includes two launch pads for Zenit launchers. One of these launch
pads was almost completely destroyed during a failed launch in 1990. Zenit is
a relatively new launcher, which began operation in 1985. It can deliver about
13 metric tons into a low earth orbit and its military use has been primarily for
launches of reconnaissance and signal intelligence satellites.26 Because the
launcher is produced in Ukraine, its use for military launches will probably
decrease.
Launch complex 90 is used for launches from a Tsiklon light launcher,
also produced in Ukraine. The launcher is a modified R-36 (SS-9) missile and
is used for a variety of military and civilian applications. It can deliver about
3.5 metric tons into a low earth orbit and has been recently used for the
launch of a new US-PU naval intelligence satellite.
Other launch complexes at Baykonur are ICBM silos, modified to accom-
modate space launches performed by converted missiles. These are launch
complex 175 Rokot launcher (a converted UR-100NU/SS-19 missile) and
launch complex 109 of Dnepr launcher (a converted R-36M/SS-18 missile).
Used as launchers, these missiles can deliver into a low earth orbit about 1.8
26. A. Zak, “Rockets: the Zenit Family,” Russian Space Web, http://www.russianspaceweb.
com/zenit.html, accessed October 12, 2003.
Figure 1: Space Launch Sites and the Network of Control and Measurement
Complexes
and 4.5 metric-ton payloads, respectively. Despite their military origin, these
launchers have not been used in the military space program.
Launch complexes 110 and 250 were built for the Buran-Energia project,
although some facilities date back to the N-1 lunar program. These complexes
were used for the Energia heavy launcher in 1987 and 1988. Since then, the
program has been terminated and the launch facilities mothballed. It is highly
unlikely that the Energia system will resume or that these facilities could be
used without substantial modification and upgrade.
Russia and Kazakhstan agreed in January 2004 to begin joint work on a
project that would include a new launch complex for the Angara launcher.
This launcher was developed in Russia, with the intention of moving launch-
es of military satellites from Baykonur to Plesetsk. The launch complex in
Baykonur will be used for commercial launches.
Plesetsk. Established in the late 1950s as a base for R-7 ICBMs, the Plesetsk
site later became a major space-launch site for the Soviet space program as
well as a test site for the development of ballistic missiles. After the breakup
of the Soviet Union, Plesetsk was the only launch site in the Russian territory.
The site is located in the northern Arkhangelsk region of Russia (63º North
and 41º East). Compared with Baykonur or other launch sites, the northern
position of the Plesetsk imposes further limits on both the range of inclina-
tions of directly accessible orbits and the maximum payload. Despite this,
Russia is developing Plesetsk as its main launch site, particularly for military
space operations, primarily because the site already has extensive launch-sup-
port infrastructure.
Plesetsk has two launch complexes for missiles of the R-7 family (Soyuz
and Molniya). These are complex 43, with two launch pads, and complex 16,
with one; both have been used for launches of reconnaissance satellites, com-
munication satellites, and early-warning satellites deployed in HEO.
Launch complexes 132 and 133 each have one launch pad for the Kosmos-3
rocket. This light launcher, which can place about 1500 kilograms into a low
Earth orbit), is a modification of the R-14 ballistic missile. It has been used to
deliver communication, navigation, and signal intelligence satellites into low
Earth orbit. Launch complex 133 also includes a launch pad that was convert-
ed from a Kosmos-3 to a Rockot launcher.
Until recently, the Plesetsk site supported launches of Tsiklon rockets.
These launches were conducted from two launch pads at launch complex 32
used for launches of naval reconnaissance satellites. After a launch in Decem-
ber 2004, Space Forces announced that it would no longer conduct Tsiklon
launches from Plesetsk.
In the 1980s, the Soviet Union began to construct a complex that would
support launches of Zenit rockets. After a series of delays, the plans were
reconsidered and the complex was reoriented for Angara launchers. The ini-
tial plans called for Angara launches beginning in 2003–2004, but it is clear
that the work is far behind the schedule.27
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Svobodnyy. Until 1991, the Svobodnyy launch site was one of the opera-
tional bases for UR-100/SS-11 ICBMs. After the missiles were decommissioned
during Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) reductions, the base was
chosen as a location of a new space-launch site. The site, located at the lati-
tude of 52º North, can potentially provide access to a wider range of orbits
than the site in Plesetsk.
Initial development plans for the site envisioned construction of launch
complexes for Rockot and Angara launchers.28 However, in 2006 the Russian
government indicated that it will limit the activity in Svobodnyy.
So far, the only space launches conducted from the site have been those of
Start-1 launcher—a converted Topol/SS-25 ballistic missile, which can deliver
about a 600 km payload to a low earth orbit. It is launched from a road-
mobile platform and therefore does not require construction of a launch pad.
Dombarovsky. The most recent addition to the family of Russian space-
launch sites is Dombarovsky (also known as Yasnyy). Dombarovsky is an
active ICBM base—forty-two R-36M/SS-18 missiles were deployed at the site in
2007 and the site has been used for ICBM test launches as well as for a com-
mercial space launch in July 2006.
The Strategic Rocket Forces plan to use the base for launches of the Dnepr
launcher, which is a converted SS-18 missile. This missile has been used for
space launches already, though only from Baykonur. Unlike all other launch
sites, Dombarovsky will be operated by the Strategic Rocket Forces. Dnepr
launch services, whether from Baykonur or from Dombarovsky, will be mar-
keted by a company named Kosmotras. The Rocket Forces expect to conduct
up to seven space launches from the site annually.
Satellite Control and Space Surveillance Networks
The scale of the Soviet space program, both civilian and military, necessitated
substantial investment in ground facilities and infrastructure to support sat-
ellite operations. In addition to space-launch sites, the Soviet Union built a
network of ground-control and measurement facilities to control satellites, as
well as stations to receive and process information supplied by space-based
sensors and to deliver this information to military and civilian users. The
Soviet Union also developed a network of satellite-tracking facilities that
allowed it to monitor the space activities of other countries.
Control and Measurement Centers. Every space system includes a ground
component from which operators control satellites and process data. The
ground equipment is usually installed at one of twelve stationary control and
measurement complexes (OKIKs), which are dispersed throughout the terri-
tory of the Soviet Union (see Table 6 and Figure 1). Some of these complexes
specialize in certain tasks—the center in Galenki in the Far East, for example,
has an antenna that allows it to communicate with interplanetary spacecraft.
However, a center’s mission usually is determined by the requirements of a
28. “Zapuski s kosmodroma Svobodnyy nachnutsya ne ranshe 2005 g,” SpaceNews.ru,
http://www.spacenews.ru/spacenews/live/full_news.asp?id=9209, accessed June 24, 2004.
particular system. Different programs may share installations if possible, but
for the most part each program has its own dedicated equipment.
In the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia lost a significant part of the
Soviet control and measurement infrastructure. Ukraine had three complexes
of this type, one of which, in Yevpatoriya, was dedicated to deep-space com-
munication and served as a node in the regional network. One complex in
Ukraine served as a regional center for navigation and communication satel-
lites.29 A similar complex at Priozersk in Kazakhstan, close to the major mis-
sile defense test site at Sary-Shagan, provided support for communication
and navigation satellites. A complex of a different kind was located in Kitab,
Uzbekistan. It was one of the newest additions to the control and measure-
ment network and was equipped with laser measurement systems.30
In addition to the network of control and measurement centers, Russia
maintains a network of smaller orbit-measurement facilities; this network
includes more than a dozen small centers that provide trajectory and orbit
measurements. Some of these facilities are situated along the trajectories fol-
lowed by ballistic missiles during tests; others are located in the vicinity of
space-launch sites. To supplement stationary systems, Russia operates and
deploys as necessary a number of smaller mobile trajectory-measurement sys-
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Table 6: Control and Measurement Complexes
Location Designation Comment
Russia
Eniseisk OKIK-4
Vulkannyy OKIK-6
Barnaul OKIK-7 Measurement complex
Krasnoye Selo OKIK-9
Kolpashevo OKIK-12
Nizhniye Taltsy OKIK-13
Shchelkovo OKIK-14
Galenki OKIK-15 Deep-space communication
Solnechnyy OKIK-17
Vorkuta OKIK-18
Lekhtusi Training OKIK
Ukraine
Dunayevtsy Navigation and communication
Yevpatoriya Deep-space communication
Simferopol
Kazakhstan
Priozersk Navigation and communication
Uzbekistan
Kitab Included laser ranging systems
29. Voyenno-kosmicheskiye sily, vol. 3 (Moscow, 2001) p. 180.
30. Voyenno-kosmicheskiye sily, pp. 187–188.
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tems. The Soviet Union also had five ship-based measurement systems, but
none are in use today.
Most of these control and measurement complexes and facilities are man-
aged by the Main Space Systems Center (GITsIU KS) located in Krasnozna-
mensk (also known as Golitsyno-2), near Moscow. The center is a main con-
trol unit for the Space Forces. It directs activities and accumulates data about
operations for almost all military space-based systems. Although the Space
Forces manage the launch of all satellites, the military usually transfer control
of civilian satellites to their separate control facilities shortly after launch.
However, some civilian systems use the hardware of the Space Forces’ control
and measurement network.
Subdivisions within the main center are responsible for specific programs.
For example, a separate center, also located in Krasnoznamensk, is responsi-
ble for control of the Glonass system.31 Some military systems, however, are
managed completely separately. Among these are the US-KS and US-KMO
early-warning systems, which have their own control center in Kurilovo,
Serpukhov region,32 and the US-PU naval intelligence system, which tradi-
tionally has been managed by the Navy.33
Space Surveillance and Tracking Systems. As with many other components
of the space program, the space-surveillance and space-tracking systems that
Russia inherited from the Soviet Union were adversely affected by the break-
up of the Soviet Union. The Soviet space-tracking system relied primarily on
early-warning radar stations deployed along the periphery of the Soviet terri-
tory. At the time of the breakup, most of the newer Daryal/Pechora radar sys-
tems were under construction; after 1992, they were left outside Russian ter-
ritory. As a result, Russia has had to rely on older radar systems, some of
which have been in operation since the early 1970s, for its space-tracking
(and early-warning) needs.34
At the core of the radar network, which provides Russia with the capabili-
ty to track objects in space, are: the Dnestr-M/Dnepr/Hen House radar sys-
tems at Olenegorsk (Murmansk region, Russia), Mishelevka (Irkutsk region,
Russia), Balkhash (Kazakhstan), Sevastopol (Ukraine), and Mukachevo
(Ukraine); the Daryal/Pechora radar systems at Olenegorsk, Pechora (Russia),
and Gabala (Azerbaijan); and the Volga radar system in Baranovichi (Belarus).
Many of these are outside Russia, which as a result must negotiate terms of
use with the host country.
In addition to using dedicated early-warning radar systems, Russia also
tracks objects in space using the radar of the Moscow missile-defense system.
It has been reported that the Don-2N/Pushkino radar provides the most accu-
rate tracking information.
31. I. Gorbunov, “Troistvennaya druzhba,” Vremya novostey, April 5, 2004.
32. Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System.”
33. A. I. Savin, G. F. Zotov, and Yu.Ye. Petrushchenko, “Sistema morskoi razvedki i tse-
leukazaniya,” http://www.navy.ru/science/sor7.htm, accessed October 14, 2003.
34. Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System.”
Other space-tracking capabilities are located at the Krona facility in
Zelenchukskaya, Karachaiyevo-Cherkessia. The facility includes dedicated
space-surveillance radar systems, which will be soon complemented by a laser
ranger system.35
To track objects at high altitudes, where radars cannot see, Russia oper-
ates optical surveillance facilities. The most advanced of these systems is the
Okno system, located in Nurek, Tajikistan. Construction of this system
began in the 1980s, which reached operational status only in 1999. The Okno
system can detect spacecraft at altitudes up to 40,000 km.36 Scientific tele-
scopes of the Academy of Sciences can also be assigned to track space objects
if necessary.
ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM
The Soviet Union was the only country that developed and operationally
deployed an anti-satellite (ASAT) system to attack satellites in low earth orbits.
The United States worked on an ASAT system during the cold war, but aban-
doned these efforts during the early stages of development.
The development of the Soviet ASAT system began in the early 1960s, and
the first test flights of maneuverable spacecraft were performed in 1963–1964.
The TsNII Kometa design bureau of the Ministry of Radio Industry managed
the development of the system. The space launcher used in the system was a
modified R-36 (SS-9) missile, developed by OKB-586 design bureau (now
Yuzhnoye Design Bureau). In addition to the launcher and the interceptor
spacecraft, the system included a network of space-surveillance radar and the
command and control center.
Initial tests of the system were conducted in 1968. During subsequent
tests, the system demonstrated its ability to destroy satellites in low orbits,
with altitudes of up to 1000 km. The system was tested with different inter-
cept geometries, onboard sensors, and proximity fuses (infrared and radar).
The system was accepted for service and commissioned for active duty in
1979. The launchers were deployed at the Baykonur test site, where testing
continued until 1982. In November 1983, the Soviet leadership announced a
unilateral moratorium on further ASAT tests.
The status of the ASAT system deployed in Baykonur has never been offi-
cially disclosed, but it is certain that the system is no longer operational.
Some reports indicate that the system underwent modernization that was
completed in 1991. Parts of the space-surveillance network that were integral
to the ASAT system were lost to Russia during the breakup of the Soviet
Union. Russia formally decommissioned the system in 1993.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND THE MILITARY
Space Forces
The current structure of the military space program is the result of a series of
reorganizations conducted in the last decade. Today, the Space Forces man-
age all military space-related activities in Russia. These forces form a separate
branch of the armed forces, and are directly subordinate to the General Staff.
This makes the Space Forces independent from the main services of the
armed forces (i.e., from the Air Force, Navy, or Army). The current configu-
ration of the Space Forces was created in June 2001 by a presidential decree
that transferred all units responsible for operating space-related facilities and
satellite systems to the newly created branch of the armed forces. The Space
Forces also currently include the units that operate the early-warning system,
space-surveillance and space-tracking systems, and the Moscow missile
defense system.
In the Soviet Union, space operations and early-warning and missile
defense systems belonged to different services and branches of the military.
Initially, all space-related activity was part of the Strategic Rocket Forces and
its predecessor, where it was managed by a separate directorate, the Main
Space Systems Directorate (GUKOS). In 1982, GUKOS was removed from the
Strategic Rocket Forces and subordinated directly to the General Staff, and in
1986, its name was changed to the United Space Systems Directorate (UNKS).
In 1992, shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the units of UNKS
were transformed into the Military Space Forces, which remained under the
direct control of the General Staff.
During a major reorganization of the Russian armed forces in 1997, the
Military Space Forces were again subordinated to the Strategic Rocket
Forces. This time, the Strategic Rocket Forces also included early-warning,
space-surveillance, and missile defense units, which were transferred from the
disbanded Air Defense Forces. Reorganization in 2001 created the Space
Forces as a separate branch of the armed forces, and all the above units were
transferred to the Space Forces.
The 1997 reorganization constituted a major change in the traditional
structure of the Soviet/Russian armed forces. Historically, early warning of a
missile attack, tracking space objects, and operating missile defense systems
were included among the missions of the Air Defense Forces, a separate serv-
ice of the armed forces responsible for strategic defense of the country. In
many important ways, its structure and responsibilities were different from
those of the space directorate or Strategic Rocket Forces; integration of these
units into the Military Space Forces after the 1997 reorganization was a diffi-
cult process, although the transition appeared to improve after the 2001
reform.
As a result of all reorganizations, the Space Forces currently include the
following main units:
• space launch sites, at Baykonur, Plesetsk, and Svobodnyy;
• the Space Systems Control Center and a network of control and mea-
surement centers;
• the Space and Missile Defense Army, which includes divisions that pro-
vide early warning, space surveillance, and missile defense; and
• other units, which include military academies and a directorate respon-
sible for the construction of space and missile defense facilities.
The Space Forces are headed by Lieutenant-General Vladimr Popovkin,
who was appointed to this post in March 2004. His predecessor, Colonel-
General Anatoly Perminov, was transferred to the Federal Space Agency,
which is responsible for the civilian space program.
Space Industry
In the Soviet Union, the defense industry played a very prominent role in the
process of research and development. The armed forces were responsible for
developing the technical requirements for new systems and then accepting
these systems for service. Industry was responsible for financing research,
development, and subsequent production of a new system. A special intera-
gency government body, the Military-Industrial Commission, coordinated
the efforts of various ministries involved in large research and development
projects.37
The Ministry of General Machine-Building held responsibility for the de-
velopment and production of space systems. The ministry handled develop-
ment and production of ballistic missiles, space launchers, satellites, and the
equipment to support these technologies. It managed most of the civilian
space programs and provided oversight for military space programs.
Another defense ministry—the Ministry of Radio Industry—developed
missile defense and early-warning systems. Design bureaus and enterprises of
this ministry worked directly on the development of large radar systems used
in early-warning, missile defense, and space surveillance and integrated their
work in these areas into projects that involved other ministries of defense
industry. For example, the Ministry of Radio Industry was responsible for the
space-based early-warning and the anti-satellite systems, but the launchers
and spacecraft used in these programs were developed and produced by the
Ministry of General Machine-Building.
In the years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the defense industry
underwent a radical transformation, which significantly changed the struc-
ture of the industry and the way it handles the development and production
of new military systems.
In the early 1990s, as old Soviet defense ministries were being abolished,
the key design bureaus and production plants of the space industry were
transferred to the Russian Space Agency. At the same time, the role of the
new agency was not as far-reaching as that of the old Soviet ministry; it was
largely limited to handling civilian projects in space, including projects that
involved international cooperation.
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The reorganization of other enterprises in the military industry, including
those of the Ministry of Radio Industry, differed. They were first transferred
to the Ministry of Economics, and later to its successors, as this ministry un-
derwent a number of reorganizations. However, none of the successor gov-
ernmental agencies had the authority or the necessary organizational structure
to manage or coordinate new development projects. Besides, in the 1990s, the
Russian government could not sustain spending in the defense industry at
the level that had existed in the Soviet Union. As a result, much of the orga-
nizational and physical infrastructure of the defense industry has been lost.
In recent years, the Russian government has attempted several times to
restructure the defense industry and streamline the development and ac-
quisition processes. The reorganizations resulted in a structure that repeats
that of the Soviet era in some important aspects; however, in other aspects,
no less important, it differs. The acquisition process in the armed forces is
still managed by special departments inside individual services. However,
these departments must deal with defense industry design bureaus and com-
panies directly, rather than through interagency processes managed by de-
fense industry ministries and the Military Industrial Commission. The Min-
istry of Defense is also supposed to manage the development and production
budget, which previously went directly to the industry.38
The main difference between the traditional Soviet system of research and
development and the current Russian one is that the latter lacks an agency
that coordinates the efforts of various defense industry companies and deter-
mines the long-term research and development plan. This difference occurs in
both the defense industry in general and in its individual branches. For the
purpose of this analysis, it is important to note that, in the past, neither the
military space industry nor the industry responsible for missile defense and
anti-satellite weapons retained an organizational component that managed
the development of new systems. Development work in these fields has tradi-
tionally required a significant amount of coordination among various compa-
nies and ministries; the current lack of a central ministry for the oversight of
development indicates that Russia probably does not have the capability to
undertake large development programs in military space or in related fields.
An effort to correct this situation was undertaken during a major reorgan-
ization of the Russian government carried out in March 2004. As part of the
reorganization, the Russian Space Agency was transformed into a Federal
Space Agency and was subordinated directly to the prime minister. As dis-
cussed above, the new director of the agency, Colonel-General Anatoly Per-
minov, was the commander-in-chief of the Space Forces before his appoint-
ment to lead the civilian space program, an appointment that indicated the
government’s intent to strengthen both the civilian and the military space
programs.
Despite these efforts, Russia has yet to demonstrate that it can successful-
ly manage a large-scale research and development project in space, whether
38. N. Poroskov, “Kaska davit na mozgi,” Vremya novostey, May 31, 2004.
military or civilian. In fact, as we have seen, even without new programs
Russia has experienced problems maintaining the programs and infrastruc-
ture inherited from the Soviet Union.
CONCLUSION
Despite recent downturns, several aspects of the Russian space program and
related industries—the scale of the space program, the existing industrial
infrastructure, and the breadth of expertise retained by Russian companies—
will make Russia an important actor in any development related to the milita-
rization or weaponization of space. At the same time, the exact role that
Russia would play in this process is still to be determined.
One possibility would be for Russia to compete with the United States
in space (and militarily, in general), as the Soviet Union did in the past. This
view of the future, fairly popular among Russian political and military lead-
ers, may be explained by the fact that space technology is one of the few areas
in which Russian technologies remain internationally competitive. Leaders
see space as an area in which Russia can, and therefore should, maintain pari-
ty with the United States.
The Russian leadership has been paying close attention to the space pro-
gram in recent years, which seems to indicate that Russia has set the goal of
developing and supporting a full range of military space systems. If these
plans materialize, Russian military satellites could become potential targets
for space-based weapon systems (or ground-based anti-satellite systems). In
addition, the history of missile defense and anti-satellite programs of the
Soviet Union suggest that Russia could initiate new development efforts in
these areas as well. Programs in these areas would enable Russia to deploy its
own space-based weapons to counter the military space systems deployed by
the United States. Although it is highly unlikely that the relationship between
Russia and the United States would reach the point of a competition or even
an arms race in space, this possibility has been widely used to justify space-
weaponization programs. It is therefore important to consider whether the
current state of the Russian space program supports the idea of Russia as a
competitor to the United States in space.
First, Russia’s ability to deploy a range of space-based military systems
that would support the operations of the Russian armed forces—optical
reconnaissance, navigation, and signal intelligence systems—is an essential
component of competition in space. Russia does operate a number of sys-
tems of this kind, but, as discussed, none of them operates at full capacity.
In addition, most of these systems were developed in the 1980s and have not
been modernized for a substantial period of time, which hardly makes them
suitable for support of modern military operations.
In many cases, Russia has to deal with the low reliability of satellites de-
veloped in the Soviet Union. This was not a serious problem when the mili-
tary had access to a virtually unlimited launch capacity. It is a problem for
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Russia now, however, as a large number of launches are required just to
maintain constellations in a very limited configuration.
There is another problem, potentially more serious, with the current
Russian military space program. Realizing the full potential of space requires
a significant investment in the creation of an infrastructure that would allow
troops to use information and capabilities provided by the space-based com-
ponents of the system. Although Russia has been improving its capability to
launch satellites and to maintain and operate satellite constellations, the de-
velopment of infrastructure on the ground remains the weakest link, limiting
much of the effort to broaden the use of space systems.
The Glonass satellite navigation system illustrates these points particularly
well. It was developed in the 1970s and became operational in the mid-1980s.
In recent years, Russia has invested considerable effort into having a full con-
stellation of 24 Glonass satellites in orbit. In order to achieve this deployment,
it had to upgrade the spacecraft to extend their lifetimes, as it could not oth-
erwise provide enough launches to replace the satellites in orbit.39 However,
even if the plan to populate all slots in the constellation succeeds, the ground
infrastructure does not seem to be ready to take advantage of the system. For
example, it was reported that the aircraft of Military Transport Aviation do
not have Glonass receivers onboard and rely on the GPS system of the United
States instead.40
Most of the same problems are common to photoreconnaissance and sig-
nal intelligence systems. Although Russia has the capability to collect imaging
information and to monitor communications, these capabilities are not inte-
grated into the command structure of the armed forces to the extent that
would make these systems directly usable in military operations. The launch
schedule of the satellites that provide these capabilities confirm this lack of
integration—for example, there have been no serious efforts to constantly
maintain the presence of imaging satellites in orbit. The same is true of signal
intelligence satellites— Russia does not maintain fully operational constella-
tions. Although this may be explained in part by a lack of sufficient funding,
success with other systems, namely communication satellites, shows that
funding was probably not the only, or even the main, factor. As the recent
history of communication-satellite launches demonstrates, Russia has been
investing considerable effort into its space-based communication network.
This was due partly to the dual-use nature of the satellites, which are used for
both military and civilian communications; however, military systems like the
Strela system have been maintained at close to full capacity.
The situation with early-warning satellites is also very characteristic of the
current Russian space program. Although the space-based early-warning sys-
tem is considered an important element of the strategic command and con-
trol system, Russia in effect discontinued its efforts to maintain a full constel-
39. Andrey Liscovich, “Global Navigation Satellite System.”
40. N. Poroskov, “My vynuzdeny letat po amerkansroi sisteme,” Vremya novostey, July 1,
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lation of satellites in orbit after 2001, seemingly satisfied with the limited
capability provided by the few satellites it can support. Expansion of the sys-
tem does not appear to the have the urgency that would justify efforts to
deploy the constellation in its full capacity.
All of these factors make Russia’s space systems unlikely targets for space-
based or anti-satellite weapons. Although an attack on some Russian mili-
tary—or civilian—space assets could theoretically have adverse effects on
Russia’s capability to conduct military operations, in practice none of the cur-
rently deployed military space systems is advanced enough for an attack to
make a significant difference militarily.
This situation could change if Russia were to modernize its military sys-
tems in space and better integrate them into the operations of the armed
forces. For example, if Russia completes deployment of its Glonass navigation
system, it could employ the system to expand the use of high-precision muni-
tions. Another development of this kind would be the deployment of a naval
intelligence system of the US-P/US-A (EORSAT/RORSAT) type, which would
enable the detection of aircraft carriers and other ships. This example is usually
cited (although in the context of the United States and China) as a potential
justification for the development of an anti-satellite capability that would pre-
vent deployment and operation of a naval intelligence system of this kind.41
Although a large-scale development effort of the kind described above
cannot be ruled out completely, experience of the last several years has dem-
onstrated that it is highly unlikely. For example, as discussed, Russia is experi-
encing substantial difficulties with the Glonass system. Similarly, deployment
of a new naval intelligence system (or of any other military system) would
require the kind of development effort that Russia has not yet been able to
manage successfully.
The possibility that Russia will develop its own capability to deploy wea-
pons in space or to build an anti-satellite system seems to be even more re-
mote. First, Russia would certainly not become the first country to develop
and deploy a space-related weapons system, as this would contradict its long-
standing policy on the weaponization of space and its practice of following
the United States in most technological developments. Besides, it is unlikely
that without the United States committing itself to space-weapons develop-
ment Russia would be able to make a decision to initiate any substantial
effort of its own.
Even if the United States decided to introduce weapons in space, Russia
would be unlikely to follow. Its experience with anti-satellite programs is dis-
couraging—the capabilities of the Soviet system were very limited and if used
would have had virtually no impact on the ability of the United States to op-
erate its own space-based systems. With the increase in U.S. capabilities in
space, a system of the kind that the Soviet Union had in the 1970s would be
even less useful today. Among other factors that would make development of
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space-related weapons systems less likely are the very high cost of such sys-
tems and the lack of a proper organizational structure to support a develop-
ment project in this area.
It is more likely that Russia would turn to a policy of “asymmetric re-
sponse,” planning measures to counter the systems developed by the United
States should they present a threat to Russia’s space assets. This policy would
be relatively easy to implement, for, as already noted, Russia’s limited reliance
on space systems does not make its armed forces overly susceptible to an
attack on space assets.
Russia does not have many options for the development of its own wea-
pon systems in space or for its reaction to the development of this capability
by other countries, namely the United States. However, this does not mean
that Russia will not react should the United States move forward with the
weaponization of space. As was the case with the U.S. withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty, the Russian reaction might not be very visible, but it will be
strong nonetheless. For example, Russia has used the abrogation of the ABM
Treaty as an excuse to extend the service life of its multiple-warhead ballistic
missiles and has taken other measures that have not made nuclear arsenals
safer or more secure.
Eventually, measures such as extending the life of missiles are the most
significant and dangerous global effects of new military developments,
whether missile defense or space-based weapons. The fact that these measures
and their costs are not immediately apparent does not mean that they do not
exist or that they should not be taken into account. The benefits of introduc-
ing weapons into space are highly questionable—there are few if any cases
that could possibly justify the development of space-based weapons capabili-
ties. When these benefits are weighed against the costs, the case for weapon-
ization of space is virtually indefensible.
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C H A P T E R 2
Chinese Perspectives
on Space Weapons
HU I ZHANG
Chinese officials have expressed a growing concern that U.S. missile defense
and “space control” plans, particularly the development of space weapons,
will stimulate a costly and destabilizing arms race. In April of 2002, Vice For-
eign Minister Qiao Zonghuai summarized the official Chinese view of U.S.
plans:
Considerable progress has been made in outer space-related weapons
research and military technology. It will not take long before drawings
of space weapons and weapon systems [are] turned into lethal combat
instruments in outer space. Meanwhile, military doctrines and [con-
cepts] such as “control of space” and “ensuring space superiority” have
been unveiled successively, and space operation [command] headquar-
ters and combatant troops are in the making. If we should remain in-
different to the above-mentioned developments, an arms race would
very likely emerge in outer space in the foreseeable future. Outer space
would eventually become the fourth battlefield besides land, sea and
air. If such a scenario should become reality it would be virtually im-
possible for mankind to continue their anticipated exploration, devel-
opment and utilization of outer space, and all economic, cultural and
social activities in connection with the utilization of outer space would
be severely interrupted.1
Although those in the Chinese scientific community have more nuanced
perceptions than many officials, particularly regarding the feasibility and ulti-
mate result of U.S. space plans, they share in the widespread concern over
U.S. ambitions. The prevailing view in China is that U.S. space weaponiza-
tion plans will have disastrous consequences for international security and the
peaceful use of outer space.
Through space weaponization, the United States seeks to neutralize
China’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Many in China worry that this would
free the United States to intervene in China’s affairs and to undermine efforts
at reunification with Taiwan. These concerns have prompted China to clearly
express—with sufficient frequency to merit an acronym—that the Prevention
1. Qiao Zonghuai, “An Effective Way to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space The Early
Negotiation and Conclusion of an International Legal Instrument,” speech presented at the
China/UN Disarmament Conference, April 3, 2002, http://www3.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/29794.
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of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is an urgent and realistic objective.
A 2004 white paper on China’s national defense emphasized, “Outer space is
the common property of mankind. China hopes that the international com-
munity would take action as soon as possible to conclude an international
legal instrument on preventing the weaponization of and arms race in outer
space through negotiations, to ensure the peaceful use of outer space.”2
In recent years, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions—annu-
ally, and with an overwhelming majority—calling for the UN Conference on
Disarmament (CD) to begin negotiations on PAROS. China and other nations
have also advocated at the CD in Geneva for a negotiation of PAROS. Despite
these efforts, the United States staunchly opposes any official discussion on
outer space in this forum. The dispute has resulted in a deadlock at the CD in
recent years. To resume and facilitate the CD negotiations on arms control,
the issue of space weapons will have to be examined.
In this paper, I first examine in detail the major Chinese security concerns
that are prompted by U.S. ambitions for missile defense and control of outer
space. Second, I explore possible measures that China might consider in re-
sponse to U.S. plans. Finally, I suggest technical and legal measures that the
international community could take to protect the broad range of scientific,
commercial, and military activities of all countries in space.
CHINA’S MAJOR SECURITY CONCERNS
U.S. missile defense and space weaponization plans could affect China’s na-
tional interests, security environment, and commercial and civilian space ac-
tivities. What are the various Chinese perspectives on U.S. plans and propos-
als? How does the U.S. pursuit of space dominance affect China’s security?
What is China’s view on the effect of U.S. plans on the prospects for arms
control, the nonproliferation regime, and the protection of the environment
of space?
What China Perceives
The United States is pursuing a “Space Control” strategy. Many Chinese offi-
cials and security experts have read with great interest the U.S. military plan-
ning documents issued in recent years.3 These documents explicitly envision
U.S. control of space and the achievement of global military superiority
through the use of weapons in or from space. The United States has issued a
series of official statements in recent years that discuss the vulnerability of
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U.S. space assets to attack without warning and the need to protect U.S.
satellites from all possible threats. The statements propose that the U.S. re-
spond with the forceful domination of space and denial of access to those
who may intend harm.4
Space control would assure U.S. access to and freedom of operations in
space, and would deny others’ use of space. This mission includes: space sur-
veillance, protection of U.S. space systems, prevention or negation of an ad-
versary’s ability to use space systems and services for purposes hostile to U.S.
national security interests, and direct support for battle management, com-
mand, control, communications, and intelligence.5 The negation mission
would include “measures to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy an
adversary’s space capabilities.”6
A number of high-level official documents show the intention of the
United States to develop, deploy, and use space weapons. In 2001, the report
of a special commission on U.S. national security in space, chaired by current
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, warned of the need “to avoid a ‘space
Pearl Harbor.’” The commissioners recommended “the U.S. government…
vigorously pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to
ensure that the president will have the option to deploy weapons in space to
deter threats to, and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.”7
In its 2003 report, Transformation Flight Plan, the U.S. Air Force lists a
number of space weapon systems desirable in the event of a space war.8 These
include space-based kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers (SBL), hyperveloci-
ty rod bundles, space-based radio-frequency energy weapons, space maneu-
ver vehicles, and evolutionary air-and-space global laser engagement. In Au-
gust 2004, the Air Force released the doctrine document Counterspace
Operations, which defines space superiority as the “freedom to attack as well
as the freedom from attack” in space.9 Counterspace operations include of-
4. These ideas are spelled out in a series of documents including: U.S. Space Command,
Vision for 2020 (Peterson AFB, Colo.: U.S. Space Command, 1997), http://www.fas.org/spp/
military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf; U.S. Space Command, Long Range Plan, (Peterson
AFB, Colo.: U.S. Space Command, March 1998),
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/lrp/toc.htm; Report of the Commission to As-
sess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Jan. 11, 2001,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.pdf; U.S. Department of Defense, Quad-
rennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf; The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight
Plan (2003, 2004), http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-
2003.pdf, http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2004.pdf; and
U.S. Air Force, Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, August 2,
2004, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf.
5. Counterspace Operations.
6. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14, Au-
gust 9, 2002.
7. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization,Washington, DC, Jan. 11, 2001.
8.U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 2003.
9. Counterspace Operations.
fensive and defensive counterspace measures. To preclude an adversary from
exploiting space to its advantage, offensive counterspace operations would
attack, possibly preemptively, an adversary’s space capability, including: satel-
lites, space stations, or other spacecraft; communication links; ground sta-
tions; launch facilities; command, control, communication, computer, intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; and space systems operated
by third party providers. As the document indicates, these offensive opera-
tions would be conducted using a number of space weapon systems, such as
anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) that “include direct ascent and co-orbital sys-
tems that employ various mechanisms to affect or destroy an on-orbit space-
craft,”10 and directed energy weapons (DEWs), such as land-, sea-, air-, or
space-based lasers.
Although there has been no formal public change in U.S. space policy,
many Chinese are convinced by official statements and visible activity that
U.S. policy is driving toward space weaponization—the development of
weapons able to destroy targets in or from space. These weapons would
presumably provide the United States with control over access to space
and activity in space. Professor Du Xiangwan, vice president of the Chinese
Academy of Engineering, said that the 2003 Transformation Flight Plan indi-
cated that “many types of space based weapons will be developed” and that
“the tendency of space weaponization is obvious and serious.” He further
pointed out that achieving military supremacy on Earth is not enough, as
“the U.S. also seeks to dominate space.”11 Ambassador Li Daoyu, President
of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, recently stated,
“As we cheer for every success of peaceful exploration and use of outer space,
we also hear the approaching bugling of war. The space military technology
is advancing rapidly. New military and combat concepts and theories like
‘control of space’ and ‘occupation of space’ are emerging. Research and
development programs of space weapons are in implementation. The
danger of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is ever
more imminent.”12
In addition to the U.S. space control theory and doctrine, other U.S. ac-
tions suggest to China that the move toward space weaponization is real. For
example, as discussed in detail below, the United States is developing and de-
ploying missile defense systems, and has a number of active space weapons
programs. Moreover, the U.S. has withdrawn from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty. Though not a party to the treaty, China viewed it as a
cornerstone of strategic stability and an important legal instrument for pre-
venting the deployment of weapons in space. Since withdrawing from the
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ABM Treaty, the United States has had free reign to accelerate its space
weaponization plans if it so chooses.
It is expected that the Bush administration will soon issue a new statement
on military space policy—providing strategic guidance to the armament of the
U.S. forces and the development of military technology in the foreseeable future.
Missile defense is one important step toward U.S. space control. The United
States has promoted the development and deployment of missile defense, par-
ticularly of an integrated, layered system, and it has increased the budgets for
missile defense programs. Since 2004, the United States has begun deploy-
ment of a ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system. The system—com-
prised of seven interceptors in Alaska and another two in California—was acti-
vated in the summer of 2006. As many scientists and experts in the United
States have pointed out, this initial GMD system would likely be ineffective
against a real attack by long-range ballistic missiles13; however, from a Chinese
perspective, there is no guarantee that the system would not someday, with
the help of a breakthrough technology, become effective. Moreover, this GMD
system could be the first step toward a more robust, layered system, capable of
targeting missiles at various points in their flight trajectories.
Some Chinese observers view this GMD system as a space weaponry system.
The scope of space weaponry, as generally defined in China, includes not only
space-based weapons, but also any weapons that target objects in outer space,
regardless of where they are based. Objects in outer space would include satel-
lites as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) traveling through outer
space.14 Because this GMD system would intercept its target at an altitude that
China has defined as outer space (above 100 km), it would be considered space
weaponry. Many Chinese feel that the U.S. plan to deploy a missile defense sys-
tem is an intentional first step toward space weaponization.
Most important, controlling space requires ASAT weapons to negate an
adversary’s space capabilities, including their satellites. Even if the GMD sys-
tem does not effectively intercept incoming missiles, it will have an inherent
anti-satellite capability.15 Many experts realize that it is technically easier to in-
tercept a satellite than to kill a ballistic missile. As Bruce DeBlois and his col-
leagues explain, “Almost any midcourse missile defense system could threaten
satellites, which are more fragile and more predictable (and therefore easier
13. Lisbeth Gronlund, David C. Wright, George N. Lewis, and Philip E. Coyle III, Techni-
cal Realities: An Analysis of the 2004 Deployment of a U.S. National Missile Defense System
(Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, May 2004).
14. This interpretation of space weaponry is very popular in several authoritative Chinese
publications. See Du Xiangwan, Science and Technology Foundation For Nuclear Arms Control
(Beijing: National Defense Industry Pub., 1996); Liu Huaqiu, ed., Arms Control and Disar-
mament Handbook, (Beijing: National Defense Industry Pub., 2000).
15. See, e.g., Qiu Yong, “Analysis on the ASAT Capability of the GMD Interceptor,” presenta-
tion at the Sixteenth International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Bei-
jing, China, July 17–25, 2004; David Wright and Laura Grego, “Anti-Satellite Capabilities
of Planned US Missile Defence Systems,”Disarmament Diplomacy 68 (December 2002/Jan-
uary 2003).
to hit) than ballistic missile warheads.”16 The SBL, kinetic kill vehicles, GMD
system, sea-based midcourse defense system, and theater high altitude area
defense (THAAD) system would all be capable of attacking satellites in low
Earth orbit (LEO) and, given an augmented booster, could reach higher or-
bits as well.17 As David Wright points out, GMD “could intercept a large frac-
tion of those satellites even from two deployment sites.” He further notes that
“the missile defense tests that have been done so far are much more relevant
to demonstrating an ability to intercept satellites than to intercept missile
warheads.”18 Aware of this technical reality, some in China have argued that
the Bush administration’s rush to deploy GMD is primarily motivated by a de-
sire to acquire ASAT capability. Fu Zhigang, the First Secretary of the Perma-
nent Mission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the UN in Geneva,
stated, “To pursue missile defense programs is part and parcel of the relevant
country[’s] long-term strategy to control…outer space.”19
It is not difficult to understand why Chinese officials hold this view. To
control access to space and defend U.S. space assets requires a missile defense
system with global coverage. As shown in some military documents, missile
defense is considered an important part of U.S. “space control” strategy. For
example, the U.S. Space Command document Vision for 2020made clear that
national missile defense is a “key” to “Global Engagement Capabilities.”20
Current U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) strategies aim to engage ballis-
tic missiles in all phases—boost, midcourse, and terminal. The 2002 U.S. Nu-
clear Posture Review (NPR) included guidance for missile defense program de-
velopment. The NPR states, “Missile defense is most effective if it is layered;
that is, able to intercept ballistic missiles of any range in all phases of their
flight.”21 It is expected that a robust BMD system capable of global coverage
would start intercepting an ICBM as early as the boost phase,22 which would
require the use of space weapons such as the SBL and the space-based intercep-
tor (SBI). Both of these systems would be deployed in LEO and used to destroy
ICBMs in their boost phase. A layered BMD system would also include space-
based sensors, such as early-warning satellites (e.g., Defense Support Program
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satellites, Space-based Infrared System–High [SBIRS-high]) and a space track-
ing and surveillance system (now STSS, previously referred to as Space-based
Infrared System–Low [SBIRS-low]). Thus, a global BMD system would result
in the deployment of weapons in space. In fact, the U.S. Department of De-
fense indicated in December 2002 that the United States would continue the
“development and testing of space-based defenses, specifically space-based ki-
netic energy (hit to kill) interceptors and advanced target tracking satellites.”23
The current U.S. budget for missile defense shows continued interest in a
number of other programs related to space weapons.24 First, in April 2007,
the Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) satellite was launched into LEO.
The satellite’s infrared sensors gather data to assist in distinguishing a rocket
body from a rocket plume during boost phase. The data from these tests
would be used to develop space-based boost-phase interceptors. Moreover, if
the NFIRE payload is to include a kill vehicle, as the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) is planning in a follow-on mission, it will effectively serve as an ASAT
weapon. Second, the space-based interceptor test-bed program is funded to
develop and test plans for a lightweight, kinetic-kill SBI. MDA expects the pro-
gram to conduct its first experiment around 2012 and to be comprised of a
few satellites armed with interceptors in orbit to test the functionality of a
space-based BMD system.25 This small number of interceptors would offer
little defense against missiles because global coverage requires thousands of
interceptor satellites in LEO.26 However, these few satellites could have very
significant ASAT capability, including against satellites in geosynchronous
orbit.27 Third, research on the SBL was conducted for some time as part of
boost-phase missile defense. Although MDA cancelled the program in 2002,
directed energy initiatives can still be found in other programs, and the possi-
bility of reviving the SBL program in MDA still exists. All three of these space-
based anti-ballistic missile weapons—the NFIRE satellite, SBIs, and the SBL—
would also function as ASAT weapons and as a means to deny adversaries
access to space.
The United States has space weapons programs beyond missile defense. The
United States is pursuing a number of other ASAT weapons programs. For in-
stance, the army launched the Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite program in 1990
to develop a ground-launched kinetic kill vehicle capable of destroying an
enemy satellite. The program currently is limited to the development of three
flight-test ASATs that are to be shelved for possible future use. Another poten-
tial ASAT weapon system, the ground-based mid-infrared advanced chemical
23. U.S. Department of Defense, “Missile Defense Operations Announcement,” December
17, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2002/b12172002_bt642-02.html.
24. See, e.g., Federation of American Scientists, Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of
the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space,October 2004; Jeffrey Lewis, “Programs to Watch,” Arms
Control Today, November 2004.
25. U.S. Missile Defense Agency, “The 2006 President’s Budget Request,” MDA Exhibit R-
4A (PE0603886C), http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2006/MDA/0603886C.pdf.
26. American Physical Society, Report of the APS Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems.
27. David Wright, “Technical Issues of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons.”
laser originally conceived for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), is under
development. The United States also is developing counterspace systems to
disrupt enemy satellites, e.g., the mobile, ground-based Counter Communi-
cations System used to disrupt an adversary’s satellite-based communications
for military purposes. This system was delivered recently to the Seventy-Sixth
Space Control Squadron. Moreover, the U.S Air Force has a research project
on small satellites, such as the Experimental Satellite Series, which could be
used for surveillance and as ASATs. The air force launched the first satellite in
the series in January 2003, and a second in April 2005.28
Several documents have proposed that the U.S. military develop space-
based weapons for prompt global force projection through space.29 Space-
based global strike would provide the United States with the ability to target
any point on the earth in less than 90 minutes and the capability for flexible—
and surprise—strike for a range of target types, including hard and deeply
buried targets and mobile targets. Recently, a number of these weapons—in-
cluding the common aero vehicle, long-rod penetrators, and SBLs—have been
widely discussed.30 The common aero vehicle would be an aerodynamic re-
entry vehicle with increased range and accuracy. Delivered by a military space
plane, conventional ballistic missile, or orbital system, it would strike against
hard and deeply buried land targets, naval bases and surface combatants,
massed forces, mobile targets, air bases, and other targets.31 The military space
plane, a reusable, unmanned space vehicle, would support a wide range of
military missions. As proposed, these capabilities would include “precision
strike capability; rapid unpredictable reconnaissance; new space control and
missile defense capabilities; and both conventional and new tactical space lift
missions that enable augmentation and reconstitution of space assets.”32
Long-rod penetrators, often called “rods from God” by proponents of
space-based weapons, are another tool for global power projection.33 The or-
bited log-rod penetrators, which are tungsten or uranium rods in the shape
of cones, would be de-orbited on command to strike a fix target on Earth.
High-powered SBLs to be used against terrestrial targets have also been pro-
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posed.34 As discussed, the SBL would threaten some targets with almost in-
stantaneous destruction, including combustibles, aircraft canopies, and thin-
skinned storage tanks.35
What China Fears
The United States has legitimate concerns about its space assets. Its military,
economy, and society increasingly depend on these assets, which are inher-
ently vulnerable to attack from many sources including ground-based mis-
siles, lasers, and radiation from a high-altitude nuclear explosion. However, it
does not necessarily follow that there are credible threats to those vulnerabili-
ties.36 Most Chinese analysts do not believe that other countries pose a seri-
ous threat to U.S. space assets. Only the United States and the Soviet Union
explored, developed, and tested ASATs or other space weapons. The Soviet
Union placed a moratorium on its ASAT program in the early 1980s. Although
a number of countries are capable of attacking U.S. satellites by launching a
nuclear weapon into space, there is no reason to believe that any government
would risk incurring a deadly U.S. response. Indeed, most countries, includ-
ing China and Russia, have been urging negotiations to prevent the deploy-
ment of weapons in and through space.
As many experts point out, space-based weapons cannot protect satellites,
as these weapons are vulnerable to the same types of attack as the objects they
are meant to protect.37 Chinese officials believe the real purpose of U.S. space
plans is not to protect U.S. assets but rather to further enhance U.S. military
dominance. As one official pointed out, “Space domination is a hegemonic
concept. Its essence is monopoly of space and denial of others’ access to it. It
is also aiming at using outer space for achieving strategic objectives on the
ground.”38 Ambassador Hu Xiaodi warned, “It is rather the attempt towards
the domination of outer space, which is expected to serve in turn the absolute
security and perpetual superiority (many people call this hegemony) of one
country on earth. The unilateralism and exceptionalism that are on the rise in
recent months also mutually reinforce this.”39
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Washington’s missile defense plans and ambitions to dominate the use
of space would very likely spark competitive military dynamics in space. As
China’s proposal on PAROS at the CD states, “Outer space is the common her-
itage of mankind and plays an ever-increasing role in its future development.”
China fears that the U.S. space weaponization plans will have disastrous ef-
fects on the peaceful use of outer space.40 U.S. plans will also have harmful
consequences for China’s political, military-strategic, commercial, and inter-
national security interests. Of particular concern is the effect of U.S. actions
on China’s modest deterrent capabilities, its capacity to pursue unification
with Taiwan, its commercial stake in space development, and its broader in-
terest in a stable security environment.
Arms competition in space. Because space-based weapons are at once threat-
ening to other countries and vulnerable to attack, it is reasonable to assume
that countries capable of blocking their use would do so. One possible re-
sponse would be the development of ASATs to target space-based weapon sys-
tems. It is widely believed that space-weapons platforms and sensor satellites
would become prime high-value targets and the most vulnerable to defense
suppression attacks. Destroying a satellite is far simpler than destroying a
warhead carried on a reentry vehicle. As a result, for systems that rely on strike
weapons or crucial sensors based in space (e.g., BMD), as Ashton Carter stat-
ed, “ASAT attack on these components is probably the cheapest and most ef-
fective offensive countermeasure.”41 It is reasonable to believe that other
countries could resort to asymmetric methods to counter critical and vulnera-
ble space-based components in LEO, such as weapon carrier vehicle satellites
and space-based tracking satellites.
China fears that U.S. space weaponization plans, if acted on, will in-
evitably lead to an arms race in outer space and risk turning space into a bat-
tlefield. Richard Garwin, among others, speculates that “if there are weapons
in space, then there will be extensive development and deployment of ASAT,
in order to negate those weapons.”42 Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi ex-
pressed China’s concerns about an arms competition in space:
The country that takes the lead in deploying weapons in space will
enjoy an advantage for a period, but it will not be able to monopolize
space weapons. Other states, when they find it affordable economical-
ly, scientifically and technically, will follow suit at a different pace and
scale. This many not generate a space arms race in its strict sense (be-
cause other states are not really competing with the leading power),
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but the space weapon arsenal will inevitably develop and increase both
qualitatively and quantitatively. As soon as the weapons are deployed
in outer space, the international community will have to change its ef-
forts from preventive ones to the aim of space disarmament. Soon after-
wards, as a few other countries (major powers) also have put their
weapons in the arena of outer space, there will be an attempt towards
space weapon non-proliferation—that is, let the haves continue their privi-
leged position, while prohibiting other have-nots from accessing space
weaponry. In other words, an old story will unfold in a new form.43
A loss of strategic nuclear deterrent capability. China developed its nuclear
weapons to break up the nuclear monopoly of the two cold war superpowers
and to prevent nuclear blackmail. China’s nuclear policy is clearly expressed in
its 2002 defense white paper: “China has always exercised utmost restraint on
the development of nuclear weapons, and its nuclear arsenal is kept at the
lowest level necessary for self-defense only.”44 The PRC has one of the smallest
nuclear arsenals of all the nuclear weapons states. On the day it declared its
possession of nuclear weapons, China adopted a nuclear no-first-use policy,
and a nuclear no-use policy against non-nuclear weapons states or nuclear
weapons free zones. China has consistently urged all nuclear weapon states
to arrive at a nuclear no-first-use agreement.
It is reported that China has about twenty ICBMs with a range of 13,000
km, capable of reaching the United States. Unlike the warheads of other nu-
clear powers, as reported, China’s nuclear warheads are not on launch-on-
warning status because China does not have an effective early-warning sys-
tem. Thus, China’s nuclear deterrence is based on the retaliatory capability it
retains after absorbing a nuclear attack. Unless it could confidently eliminate
China’s twenty ICBMs in an initial strike, the United States would in theory be
deterred from initiating a nuclear attack. If the United States were to deploy
missile defense systems, this situation would change completely. A space-
based, boost-phase defense would be particularly threatening.
Within China, it is widely believed that U.S. missile defense and space
planning targets China. Many Chinese are skeptical of U.S. statements that
the purpose of missile defense is to protect against “rogue” states. Even if
North Korea successfully deployed a small number of nuclear-tipped ICBMs—
a principal U.S. concern—it is highly unlikely that it would use them. What
leader would risk national suicide by launching a nuclear attack on the Unit-
ed States? From China’s perspective, it seems untenable that the United
States would expend massive resources on a system that has only “rogue”
states in mind.45 Some missile defense advocates in the United States have
not minced their words about the utility of the system for addressing Chinese
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capabilities. For example, Peter Brookes, advisor on East Asian affairs to the
international relations committee of the U.S. Congress, said that the major
motive that drives the United States to develop and deploy missile defense
systems is China’s missile capability.46 Recently, Lieutenant General Henry A.
Obering III of the U.S. Air Force, director of the MDA, expressed clearly that
the United States is expanding its preliminary missile defense system to ad-
dress potential threats from China and others. He told defense reporters,
“What…we have to do is, in our development program, be able to address
the Chinese capabilities, because that’s prudent.”47 Chinese government offi-
cials are more inclined to believe these comments than stated U.S. purposes.
As Ambassador Sha Zukang said, “Though the U.S. government has publicly
denied that China is a major target of its NMD program, the history of missile
defense programs and the acknowledged design capabilities of NMD show
that the proposed system can be directed against China and can seriously af-
fect China’s limited nuclear capability.”48
Even a limited missile defense system could in principle neutralize China’s
twenty single-warhead ICBMs capable of reaching the United States.49 Chinese
officials realize this danger. “It is evident,” said Ambassador Sha Zukang, who
until recently was the director general of the Department of Arms Control and
Disarmament at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “that the U.S. NMD
will seriously undermine the effectiveness of China’s limited nuclear capability
from the first day of its [NMD] deployment. This can not but cause grave con-
cerns to China.”50 Many Chinese fear that whether or not U. S. missile defenses
are as effective as planned, decision-makers could become incautious in their ac-
tions, willing to risk a disarming first strike because they believe they have the
capability to intercept any surviving Chinese missiles.51
Some Chinese analysts argue that deployment of U.S. missile defenses
will also support offensive operations.52 China is concerned about the U.S.
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refusal to declare a no-first-use policy, and the 2002 NPR has fed these anxi-
eties. The NPR specifically described conditions for the use of nuclear wea-
pons in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and the possible use of tacti-
cal nuclear weapons.53 The United States’ lack of a no-first-use policy, in
combination with a deployed BMD system, would lower the nuclear thresh-
old and increase the reliance on nuclear weapons, making nuclear conflict
with China more likely. According to John Steinbruner, China and other
countries have good cause for concern: “A defensive missile deployment
operating in conjunction with a preemptive attack would pose a formidable
threat to the deterrent capability of any military establishment operating out-
side of the United States alliance system.”54
There is also concern in China about U.S. plans for global force projec-
tion. Current Chinese nuclear modernization plans call for the development
of mobile ICBMs. Some proposed space weapons (such as common aero vehi-
cles) would be used against hard and deeply buried land targets and mobile
targets, and would pose a huge threat to mobile ICBMs. The NPR recognizes
the value of enhancing U.S. capacity to target mobile missiles. As the report
says, “A U.S. demonstration of the linkage between long-range precision
strike weapons and real-time intelligence systems may dissuade a potential
adversary from investing heavily in mobile ballistic missiles.”55
Consequently, China worries that U.S. space weapons and its missile de-
fense system could subject China to political or strategic blackmail and in-
fringe on China’s sovereignty. These capabilities would free the United States
to intervene much more in China’s affairs, including efforts at reunification
with Taiwan. This concern has been underscored in recent years by U.S. ef-
forts to boost cooperation with Japan, and potentially with Taiwan, in re-
search and development of advanced theatre missile defense.
Damage to arms control and nuclear proliferation regimes. The inherent of-
fensive and first-strike capabilities offered by space weapons would likely pro-
voke destabilizing military and political responses from other countries. As
Ambassador Hu points out, “With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit
and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate WMD
[weapons of mass destruction] or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do
harm to global peace, security and stability, hence be detrimental to the fun-
damental interests of all States.”56 Nuclear experts have warned that deploy-
53. See, e.g., Paul Richter, “U.S. Works Up Plan for Using Nuclear Arms,” Los Angeles
Times, March 9, 2002, http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-000017501mar09.
story; William M. Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,” Los Angeles Times, March
10, 2002, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-arkinmar10.story. Excerpts from
the Nuclear Posture Review are available online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
54. John Steinbruner, statement to the Parliament of Denmark at the Hearings on Missile
Defense, April 25, 2001, http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Publications/Copenhagen
NMDStatement.htm.
55. “Nuclear Posture Review.”
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ing even limited missile defenses would increase the difficulty of reducing the
numbers of warheads.57 Russia has threatened to respond to any country’s de-
ployment of space weapons.58
The Chinese government holds that a secure international environment
and strategic stability are the foundations for advancing the international nu-
clear disarmament process.59 However, U.S. missile defense and space
weaponization plans will destroy these foundations. Ambassador Hu made
this point clearly in remarks to the CD:
It should be stressed that efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space
and those on nuclear disarmament go hand in hand. In this perspec-
tive, it is of crucial importance for nuclear disarmament that a missile
defense system undermining strategic stability should not be devel-
oped, and that no weapons should be deployed in outer space. It is
hard to imagine that once a full-fledged missile defense system is put in
place or weapons have been introduced into outer space there can be
business as usual in nuclear disarmament. At best, such moves would
never be conducive to nuclear disarmament.60
If China, or any other nation, felt a need to build new warheads to en-
hance deterrent capabilities in response to perceived provocation in space,
this would increase demand for plutonium and highly enriched uranium to
fuel those weapons. The process could harm the chances of negotiating a suc-
cessful Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which has long been seen as a
key building block for controlling nuclear weapons proliferation and for
eventual disarmament. Failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament
process, to which the nuclear weapon states are committed under the Treaty
on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would undermine the already
fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime. In short, China, as evidenced in
Chinese statements at the CD, is concerned that the deployment of space wea-
pons “will disrupt strategic balance and stability, undermine international and
national security and do harm to the existing arms control instruments, in
particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles, thus triggering new
arms races.”61
Limitations on China’s civilian and commercial space activities. China’s most
urgent national objective is economic growth. It needs a stable international
security environment to concentrate its resources on economic development.
Chinese security analysts are mindful that the United States’ Strategic De-
57. See, e.g., Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and Future of U.S.
Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 40–92.
58. Steve Gutterman, “Reports: Russia Threatens Retaliatory Steps if any Country Deploys
Weapons in Space,” APWorldstream, June 2, 2005.
59. Hu Xiaodi, statement at the Plenary of the Second Part of the 2005 Session of the CD,
June 23, 2005.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
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fense Initiative in the 1980s induced the Soviet Union to waste resources in
response. They argue that the intention of U.S. missile defense plans could be
to bring China into an arms race that would exhaust its resources and harm
its economic development. Though any response to U.S. missile defense
measures would cost China much less than the development of comprehen-
sive missile defense, it would nevertheless divert resources from economic de-
velopment. In particular, space weaponization could limit China’s civilian
and commercial space activities.
Since launching its first satellite in 1970, China has made steady progress
in launch vehicle design and other areas of space technology development for
civilian and commercial purposes. China has operational civilian satellites, a
family of launchers, a modern space launch complex, and a growing list of
customers in the international satellite-launch market.62 By October 2000,
China had developed and launched 47 satellites of various types, including re-
coverable remote-sensing satellites and satellites for telecommunications, me-
teorological research, Earth observation, and other scientific and technologi-
cal research. China also initiated a manned space flight program in 1992,
which has developed both manned spacecraft and a high-reliability launching
vehicle. Between November 1999 and December 2002, China launched four
unmanned experimental Shenzhou (“magic ship”) spacecraft. China success-
fully launched the Shenzhou 5 manned spaceship in October 2003, and the
Shenzhou 6 manned spaceship in October 2005. China is now planning to ex-
plore the Moon with unmanned spacecraft.
The global economy is intimately tied to assets in space.63 During the last
two decades or more, China has participated in bilateral, regional, multilater-
al, and international space cooperation in different forms, such as commercial
launching services, and these have yielded significant achievements. In 1985,
the Chinese government opened the “Long-March” rockets to the interna-
tional commercial launching market. Since then, China has a growing list of
customers in the international satellite-lunch markets,64 and seeks to acquire
a greater share of the international commercial launching market.
China’s space launch complexes are relatively large and comprehensive.
Three different facilities provide the capability to launch objects into LEO,
geosynchronous, and polar orbits. With these launch complexes, China has
positioned itself to support any requirement for a space launch, commercial,
military, or scientific. Though these matters are not linked explicitly in official
public documents, China perceives itself as a developing space power, in need
of free access to space for its own economic growth. The U.S. pursuit of
space control would threaten China’s civilian and commercial space activities,
and even deny China access to space.
62. Information office of PRC State Council, “White Paper on China’s Space Activities,”
Nov. 22, 2000, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/8/.
63. Yao Yunzhu, “BMD: A Step to Weaponize the Outer Space,” presentation to theWork-
shop on Moving Beyond Missile Defense, Shanghai, China, Nov. 30–Dec. 2, 2001.
64. “White Paper on China’s Space Activities,” 2000.
Space debris. Development and use of space for military and civilian pur-
poses over four decades has resulted in a large amount of man-made space
debris. Man-made space debris includes dead spacecraft, discarded rocket
bodies, launch- and mission-related castoffs, remnants of satellite breakups,
solid-rocket exhaust, and frayed surface materials.65 These artificial objects,
along with natural objects (i.e., meteoroids), contribute to the particulate en-
vironment of Earth. A collision with even a tiny piece of space debris can
damage or destroy a spacecraft, because its approach velocity is very high.
The increasing amount of space debris poses a considerable hazard to all
kinds of spacecraft, which concerns many Chinese scientists.66
Currently, there are about 16,000 space debris objects larger than 10 cm
in size, of which 13,000 are in LEO (below 3,000 km), 2,000 are in medium
Earth orbit (MEO) (3,000–30,000 km), and 600 are in geosynchronous orbit
(36,000 km).67 However, the probability of collision with a spacecraft re-
mains low. Because the larger pieces are tractable, and spacecrafts can take
measures to avoid them, they do not yet pose a significant threat. Space ob-
jects smaller than 1 cm probably exceed tens of millions and are hard to detect,
but spacecrafts are can be protected against them by shielding, depending on
the shield type.
The main threat to spacecraft is medium-size debris (1–10 cm), which is
numerous and cannot be tracked and evaded. A spacecraft with insufficient
shielding would be destroyed upon collision with such an object. It is esti-
mated that there are over 300,000 medium-size debris objects—120,000 in
LEO, 170,000 in MEO, and 20,000 in geosynchronous orbits.68 At present,
these objects do not pose an unacceptably high risk for spacecraft. For exam-
ple, the mean time between debris impacts on a spacecraft with a cross-sec-
tional area of 100 m2 is about once in 245 years at an altitude of 800 km and
once in 534 years at an altitude of 1500 km.69 However, if space activity con-
tinues in a business as usual scenario (i.e., no space weaponization), and if
there were no mitigation measures to limit and control the future growth of
the space debris population, the risk from space debris, in particularly in LEO,
would be increased within decades to a level that would pose unacceptable
46 RUSSIAN AND CHINESE RESPONSES TO U.S. MILITARY PLANS IN SPACE
65. N. L. Johnson, “Controlling Debris in Space,” Scientific American 279, no. 2 (August
1998): 62.
66. See a number of research papers presented at “Symposium on the Sustainability of
Space Resources & Technology,” Beijing, China, April 13–15, 2004, including: Chen
Shenyan and Hu Zhendong, “Recent Developments on Hypervelocity Impact and Simula-
tion Software for Space Debris”; Huang Hai and Jia Guanghui, “Study on Hypervelocity
Impact Simulation of Space Debris”; and Wang Ting, “Research on Collision Probability
between Debris Clouds and Spacecraft.” See also Dong Yunfeng, “NMD, Arms Race and
Space Debris,” Presentation at the Fourteenth International Summer Symposium on Sci-
ence and World Affairs, Urbana, Illinois, July 15–21, 2002.
67. R. Walker et al.,Update of the ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook, Executive Summa-
ry, July 2002, http://www.esa.int/gsp/completed/execsum00_N06.pdf.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE WEAPONS 47
risk to spacecrafts.70 In recent years, scientists and engineers have investigat-
ed different debris mitigation measures and spacecraft protection techniques
to reduce the risks to future missions.
Weaponizing space would worsen the space debris problem. Under U.S.
space plans, a larger number of space weapons could be deployed. A BMD sys-
tem would include dozens or possibly hundreds of SBL weapons, and hun-
dreds or thousands of SBI and sensor satellites; additional weapons for attack-
ing satellites or Earth targets could be added to the total. Most of these
systems would be stationed in LEO. The deployment of these weapons would
increase the object population, and the launching and testing of these
weapons would increase space debris. Moreover, the deployment of unlimit-
ed space-based weapons in the increasingly crowded LEO would limit orbit
resource usage for civilian purposes.
Even worse, if ASAT weapons are used to destroy and fragment satellites,
more orbital debris will be generated. As part of an ASAT test in September
1985, the United States used an air-launched miniature homing vehicle to frag-
ment the Solwind spacecraft. More than 200 catalogued pieces of debris were
produced, and most remained in orbit for several years.71 Although the frag-
ments created by the impact of an SBI on a boost-phase missile would not sig-
nificantly contribute to the orbital debris in LEO,72 an SBI would fragment a
satellite into hundreds of pieces of tractable debris (larger than 10 cm) and far
more medium-size pieces of orbital debris. These medium-sized objects, with
mass ranging from several grams to tens of grams, at a collision velocity of
about 10 km/s could fragment another hundred-kilogram to several ton satel-
lite. The mass distribution of fragments generated in hypervelocity impacts
have demonstrated that a two-ton satellite can be broken into several hundred
thousand medium-size pieces, hundreds of larger ones, and billions of frag-
ments smaller than 1 cm. Thus, fragments from several shattered satellites
could result in a several-fold increase in the orbital debris population in LEO.
Many scientists are concerned that once space debris reaches a “critical
density” a process of collisional cascading—a chain reaction where collision
fragments trigger further collisions—will start. As a result, the density of de-
bris surrounding Earth would be too great to allow the stationing or penetra-
tion of any satellites. Some experts estimate that a critical density of space
debris would be reached in LEO with only a few-fold increase over current
levels.73 Some scientists estimate that the density may already be sufficiently
70. See, e.g., P. Eichler and D. Rex, “Debris Chain Reactions,” Paper AIAA-90-1365,
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Advances in Space Research 11, no. 12 (1991): 63.
71. N. Johnson and D. McKnight, Artificial Space Debris (Malabar, Flor.: Orbit Book Com-
pany, Inc., 1987).
72. Federation of American Scientists, Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS
Panel on Weapons in Space,October 2004.
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great at 900–1000 km and 1500–1700 km to sustain a cascade of collisions.74
Thus, it is not implausible to suggest that fragmenting several satellites at
LEO could lead to a chain reaction, which would result in the elimination of
satellites and vehicles in LEO. This includes those used for space exploration,
such as the Hubble Space Telescope (at about 600 km), the Space Shuttle, In-
ternational Space Station, Earth-observing satellites, photo-reconnaissance
satellites, and some navigation satellites. As Joel Primack points out, “Wea-
ponization of space would make the debris problem much worse, and even
one war in space could encase the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris
that would thereafter make space near the Earth highly hazardous for peace-
ful as well as military purposes.”75
Given concerns about space debris, some senior scientists in China em-
phasize that the definition of environmental pollution should not refer solely
to Earth, but should include outer space, where human activities are also car-
ried out. As Du Xiangwan, vice president of Chinese Academy of Engineer-
ing, recently noted, “Indeed prevention of pollution in space should be put
on [the] agenda …as time goes by, this problem will become increasingly ob-
vious.” He continued, “In preventing space pollution, the following two is-
sues are worth noticing: space garbage and weaponization of space.”76 Recent
official Chinese statements at the CD directly addressed concerns about space
debris: “The deployment and use of space weapons will seriously threaten the
security of space assets and impair the biosphere of the Earth. The tests of
space weapons in near-Earth orbit will exacerbate the already serious problem
of ‘space debris.’”77
CHINA’S OPTIONS FOR RESPONDING TO U.S. SPACE PLANS
Chinese analysts and policy makers are discussing whether and how to re-
spond to U.S. missile defense and space weaponization plans. A few Chinese
scholars argue that China should not respond at all because the U.S. missile
defense program is not feasible and will likely be given up. However, conver-
sations with Chinese experts and officials demonstrate that most Chinese be-
lieve that China must respond.
Historically, China developed nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of
guarding itself against the threat of nuclear blackmail. Many Chinese offi-
cials and scholars believe that China should maintain the effectiveness of
its nuclear deterrent by every possible means, to negate the threats from
missile defense and space weaponization plans.78 As one Chinese official
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stated, “China is not in a position to conduct [an] arms race with [the] U.S.
and it does not intend to do so, particularly in the field of missile defense.
However, China will not sit idly by and watch its strategic interests being
jeopardized without taking necessary measures. It is quite possible and nat-
ural for China to review its military doctrine and a series of policies on [its]
relationship with big powers, Taiwan issues, arms control and nonprolifer-
ation, etc.”79
In response to the pursuit of space weapons by the United States, the first
and best option for China—and the option it is now pursuing—is to advo-
cate an arms control agreement. However, if this effort fails and if security
concerns perceived to be legitimate are ignored, China will very likely devel-
op responses to neutralize any threat presented by U.S. actions.
The timing of such measures is still being debated. Because it is not clear
what type of missile defense system the United States will finally deploy, or
whether U.S. space control plans will be implemented, it is difficult to identi-
fy conclusively China’s specific countermeasures. China’s options for re-
sponse include: building more ICBMs; adopting countermeasures against
boost, mid-course, and terminal phase missile defense; developing ASAT
weapons; and reconsidering China’s commitments on arms control. In the
discussion below, I examine the types of countermeasures that could be used
effectively to neutralize U.S. missile defense and space control plans; China’s
technical capabilities in applying those countermeasures; and the other re-
sponses, diplomatic or legal, that might be expected. It should be noted that
these discussions are based on China’s capabilities, and should not be under-
stood as a characterization of China’s intentions.
Build More Warheads
One optimal countermeasure for China is to build more ICBMs.80 Although
some supporters of U.S. missile defense claim that China’s nuclear modern-
ization will go forward whether or not the system is deployed, many Chinese
analysts believe that U.S. missile defense efforts will encourage an accelera-
tion of China’s nuclear modernization and influence its force both quantita-
tively and qualitatively.
China’s strategic nuclear force is among the smallest forces of all declared
nuclear powers and also the most outmoded in quality. China’s silo-based,
single-warhead ICBMs (the DF-5A), of which there are approximately twenty,
are liquid-fueled missiles with warheads and fuel stored separately from the
missile. They require about two to four hours of preparation time before
launch. China has one nuclear-armed submarine, which entered service in the
late 1980s; however, the twelve submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
it carries have a fairly short range (Julang I, with a range of about 1700 km).
79. Fu Zhigang, “Concerns and Responses.”
80. See, e.g., Shen Dingli, “What Missile Defense Says to China”; Charles Ferguson,
“Sparking a Buildup: U.S. Missile Defense and China’s Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control
Today, March 2000.
The submarine patrols close to the Chinese mainland and is infrequently at
sea.81 China’s pursuit of nuclear modernization is understandable.
China initiated its nuclear modernization programs in the early 1980s.
Current efforts focus mainly on enhancing the survivability of China’s strate-
gic nuclear force via greater mobility. It is reported that China is replacing its
silo-based, liquid-fueled ICBMs with a road-mobile, solid-fueled missile (the
Dong Feng-31, or DF-31). China conducted the first flight test of this missile
in August 1999, with deployment anticipated to begin over the next several
years. It is believed that the DF-31 has a range of about 8000 km and will be
targeted primarily against Russia, India, and U.S. bases and facilities in the
Pacific Ocean. It will not reach the continental United States.82 It is reported
that China is also developing the DF-31A, a road-mobile, solid-fueled missile
with a range of up to 12,000 km. The Pentagon predicts the DF-31A will be
deployed by the end of the decade, although others see this projection as
overly optimistic.83 In addition, China is reported to have begun work on the
development of new nuclear-armed submarines (through Project 094), each
carrying 16 Julang II SLBMs that may have intercontinental range. However,
deployment of these submarines is most likely many years away.
Chinese nuclear modernization has proceeded at a very moderated pace.
Were it not for U.S. missile defense plans, the pace might not be expected to
change significantly. Because China’s focus is on survivability rather than
quantity, the size of its nuclear arsenals would likely be much smaller if they
did not have to contend with U.S. missile defenses. China certainly did not
rush to bring new missiles into its force in the past. Western sources report
that China deployed two ICBMs in 1981, a total of four by 1987, a total of five
by 1990, and about 20 by 2004.84 Extrapolating from past experience, China
would be expected to build no more than 50 ICBMs by 2015. In fact, the un-
classified 1999 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on nuclear forces
noted that by 2015 China “will likely have tens” of ICBMs capable of attacking
the United States, having added “a few tens” since 1999.85 In the most recent
NIE estimate, China is projected to have about 75–100 ICBMs by 2015.86 How-
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ever, the U.S. intelligence community seems to often overestimate China’s
nuclear forces. For example, in 1984, the Defense Intelligence Agency set “the
best estimate” for the projected number of Chinese nuclear warheads at 592
in 1989 and 818 in 1994.87 In reality, according to western reports, it is esti-
mated that there are approximately 400 warheads in the Chinese arsenal.
Given that China is currently focusing on the quality of its force, and not on
the number of its ICBMs, it might be expected that without a U.S. missile de-
fense deployment, China would deploy no more than 50 ICBMs by 2015.
However, this situation would surely change significantly with the de-
ployment of U.S. missile defenses. To maintain a credible minimum retaliato-
ry capability, China would have to shift the size and quality of its nuclear arse-
nal. The nature of the response would depend on a number of factors,
including technology, cost, and the specific missile defense system. Without
knowing the specifications of U.S. missile defense system, including the
numbers of interceptors and the firing doctrine, it is difficult to predict an
exact response.
One could still project the potential changes in the size of China’s nuclear
arsenal based on a few simple assumptions. Assume that China keeps its no-
first-use policy and that the survival rate of Chinese ICBMs after a U.S. first
strike is expected to be about 50 percent. With no U.S. missile shield, this
would leave China with 10 ICBMs for retaliation, a sufficient number to kill
at least several hundred thousand people and to deter a first strike attempt by
the United States. However, as the United States proceeds with deployment
of its limited ground-based missile defense—for example, a deployment of
100 interceptors and a follow-up deployment of up to 250 interceptors, as en-
visioned by the Clinton administration88—China’s nuclear force would need
to grow to maintain a credible deterrent. Assuming a U.S. missile defense
system would operate under a firing doctrine of two-on-one, shoot-look-
shoot, which means that two interceptors would be first launched to hit every
incoming warhead, and if these fail then another two interceptors follow, then
one might assume that four interceptors would be deployed for every expect-
ed warhead. A Chinese military planner, however, would assume the worst
case, i.e., that the first two interceptors would successfully hit their target
warhead. Thus, if the United States deployed 100 interceptors, and if China
wished to preserve for the purpose of deterrence its current retaliatory capa-
bility of 10 surviving ICBMs, then it would need a force of 120 ICBMs. Half of
these would be wiped out in an initial strike, and the missile shield would in-
tercept 50 of the remaining 60 missiles once they were launched in retalia-
tion. This would leave 10 to find their targets. In the case of 250 interceptors,
China would need at least 270 ICBMs.
87. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Nuclear Weapons Systems in China,” DEB-49-84 (April
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Of course, many other factors could affect the survival rate of China’s nu-
clear force, e.g., the ratio of mobile to silo-based missiles, the number of U.S.
warheads targeted on each silo, the quality of U.S. intelligence on Chinese
nuclear deployments, and the size and effectiveness of the missile defense sys-
tem. In short, China could need between 100 and 300 ICBMs to defeat even a
limited missile defense system. These numbers correspond roughly to the
August 2000 NIE on the foreign response to U.S. national missile defense,
which reportedly concluded that China would expand its arsenal in order to
overwhelm a limited missile defense system and could deploy up to 200 ICBM
warheads by 2015.89 Others have offered similar estimates.90
Some arms control experts in China believe that adding several hundred
ICBMs to China’s arsenal would be economically feasible. It is estimated that
building 200 ICBMs would cost China about $2 billion. This expenditure
could be spread over several years and would represent less than 2 percent of
China’s current foreign currency reserve. The cost would be less than one-
tenth of the expense to the United States of maintaining parity between
Chinese missiles and U.S. missile interceptors.91
Some Chinese experts feel that China should pursue loading MIRV (multi-
ple independently targeted reentry vehicle) warheads on its missiles, as a
more effective countermeasure to the U.S. missile defense system. It is re-
ported that China has had the technical capability to develop multiple reentry
vehicles (MRVs) for over 20 years.92 As the CIA speculated, if China needed
near-term MRV capability, it would take only a few years to develop. China
could also place MRVs or MIRVs on the DF-5 using a DF-31–type reentry vehi-
cle. But MIRVing a future mobile missile would take several years.93 Placing a
MIRV on the silo-based ICBMs, as some Chinese have suggested, would make
the force more vulnerable because China has so few nuclear warheads.94
MIRVing the mobile ICBMs would seem to be a better choice; however, it is
not clear whether China has this technology. Based on the 1998 National Air
Intelligence Center’s ballistic and cruise missile threat report, China’s DF-31
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production constrains.” See Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and
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see also Shen Dingli, “What Missile Defense Says to China.”
92. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook Chinese Nuclear Force 2001,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 57,
no. 5 (September/October 2001).
93. Ibid.
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and DF-41 (now DF-31A) ICBMs will not be MIRVed.95 There is some suspicion
that China’s MIRV technology has been limited by the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. Nonetheless, it is believed that China should pursue MIRVing its
mobile missiles as one option.
Some Chinese experts advocate China’s developing more survivable
SLBMs once this technology has matured. Others argue that SLBMs are not a
viable option for a number of reasons: they are more expensive, they are vul-
nerable to advanced U.S. anti-submarine war, and China has limited technical
capability in this area. Others propose that China adopt a “launch on warn-
ing” strategy to increase the survivability of its arsenal. However, China does
not now have an early warning system capable of supporting such a strategy.
Moreover, such a system would be vulnerable to U.S. anti-ballistic missile
weapons during a U.S. first strike, given the latent ASAT capabilities of Ameri-
can weapons. Some Chinese security analysts argue that China should give
up its no-first-use pledge, but many are suspect of such a move. How credi-
ble would a threat of nuclear attack be, if made with the knowledge that such
an attack would be followed by a devastating U.S. retaliation? Finally, some
security analysts suggest that China should deploy its own ballistic missile de-
fense system to protect itself from U.S. missiles. With so many less expensive
options, however, this proposal is unlikely to be persuasive.
Missile Defense Countermeasures
In addition to building more warheads, there are a number of feasible and
cost-effective measures that would aid China’s warheads to penetrate a missile
defense system. These measures are in many ways preferable to the MIRV op-
95. U.S. National Air Intelligence Center, “Report of Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,”
1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/index.html
Table 1: China’s Strategic Nuclear Force
Source: Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Chinese
Nuclear Forces 2006,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 3 (May/June 2006).
Missile Type Range (km) Operational Status Number
Deployed
DF-5A
(CSS-4)
ICBM
(silo-based, liquid-
fueled)
13,000 Deployed since 1981 20
DF-31 ICBM
(road-mobile,
solid-fueled)
8,000 Deployed around 2006? 0
DF-31A ICBM
(road-mobile,
solid-fueled)
~ 12,000 Deployed 2007–09? 0
Julang I SLBM 1,000–1,700 1986 12
Julang II SLBM 8,000 2008–10 0
tion.96 Scientists have proposed numerous such countermeasures.97 Most of
these measures are not just theoretical possibilities, but rather something that
every country possessing ICBMs or SLBMs, presumably including China, has
already undertaken.
Midcourse missile defenses. A number of countermeasures could feasibly
defeat midcourse missile defense. Chinese scientists have followed and dis-
cussed, for example, those countermeasures shown in the Union of Con-
cerned Scientists/MIT report Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Op-
erational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System.98 One
efficient and simple countermeasure would be the deployment of decoys with
each ICBM. Decoys can “confuse” the interceptor’s sensors system, making it
unable to discriminate between the real warhead and the decoys. The decoys
might replicate the warhead or appear slightly different from one another and
from the warhead. China might also disguise the warhead—a technique
known as “antisimulation”—by enclosing it in a radar-reflecting balloon, cov-
ering it with a shroud, hiding it in a cloud of chaff, or by using electronic or
infrared jamming measures. These penetration aids, antisimulation and decoy
technologies, are within China’s capability.99 China has reportedly made some
missile flight tests with penetration aids, such as the first flight test of China’s
new DF-31 ICBM, which included decoys, on August 2, 1999.100
China could also employ countermeasures to reduce the radar and in-
frared signatures of the warhead, making detection more difficult. For exam-
ple, China could reduce the radar cross-section of the nuclear warhead by
shaping the reentry vehicle (or a shroud around it) as a sharply pointed cone
and/or by coating it with radar-absorbing material. China could reduce the
infrared signature of the warhead by covering it with a low-emissivity coating
or by using a shroud cooled to low temperature by liquid nitrogen.
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sium on Science and World Affairs, Berlin, Germany, July 21–30, 2001; Li Bin, “The Effects
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100. National Intelligence Council, “NIE: Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic
Missile Threat through 2015,” p.16.
CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE WEAPONS 55
These countermeasures should be accessible to China. The 1999 NIE of
the ballistic missile threat to the United States also stated, “Russia and China
each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to
sell the requisite technologies.”101 As Richard Garwin pointed out, “The fun-
damental weakness of midcourse intercept is that the countermeasures are all
too simple. The money and skill needed to implement them are trivial com-
pared with the effort required to design, build and care for the ICBMs them-
selves.”102
Boost-phase defenses. The pursuit of a more effective missile defense, as
envisioned by the Bush administration, would require space-based intercept
components—such as the SBI and SBL—to catch missiles in their boost phase.
As the recent report from the American Physical Society (APS) on boost-
phase defense discussed, a number of countermeasures for SBI could be
developed.103 One of the most potent countermeasures would be a fast-burn
boost. Because it reduces the boost time by using solid-fuel, the fast-burn
booster would make the job of a boost-phase interceptor defense extremely
challenging or infeasible. The APS study concluded, “Switching from liquid-
propellant to typical solid-propellant ICBMs would cut the boost phase by a
minute or more. Boost phases as short as 130 seconds are certainly possible;
such missiles would be practically impossible to intercept.” As reported,
China is developing solid-fuel ICBMs, and may be able to develop faster-burn
rockets in the future. Other possible countermeasures include: lofting or de-
pressing the trajectory of the ICBM relative to the maximum-range trajectory
to evade attacks from space weapons; spoofing the defender’s tracking sen-
sors by deploying small, rocket-propelled decoys from the missile that mast
or mimic the radar and electro-optical characteristics of the booster; and
changing the brightness and configuration of the exhaust plume of the ICBM
to make it more difficult for infrared sensors to locate the real missile body.
For SBL, countermeasures could include: rotating the missile to distribute the
laser energy from SBL over a wide area and protecting the vulnerable parts of
the ICBM with reflective or ablative coatings.104
Moreover, the attacker could simultaneously launch several ICBMs (possi-
bly with theater or tactical ballistic missiles used as decoys) from a compact
area to overwhelm these space-weapon systems.105
Terminal phase defenses. Terminal phase missile defense could be countered
by making the high-velocity warhead maneuverable. This BMD countermea-
101. Bill Gertz, “China Develops Warhead Decoys to Defeat US Defenses,”Washington
Times, September 16, 1999, p. 1.
102. Richard Garwin, “Holes in the Missile Shield,” Scientific American (November 2004).
103. American Physical Society, Report of the APS Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems
for National Missile Defense.
104. Du Xiangwan, Science and Technology Foundation For Nuclear Arms Control; Bob Pre-
ston et al., SpaceWeapons, Earth Wars; Bruce DeBlois et al., “Space Weapons: Crossing the
U.S. Rubicon.”
105. See, e.g., David Wright et al., The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual; Bruce
DeBlois et al., “Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon.”
sure has been mentioned within the Chinese defense industry.106 It is report-
ed that China’s test of a spacecraft intended for manned flight demonstrated a
low-thrust rocket propulsion system that could be used to make warheads
maneuver to defeat a BMD system.107
In short, China has access to a large tool kit of effective, accessible, inex-
pensive (compared to BMD systems) means that can be deployed to keep re-
taliatory capabilities at a sufficiently high level. The countermeasures would
be significantly cheaper than an antimissile arsenal in space.
Anti-Satellite Weapons
Once space-based weapons systems are deployed, the platforms of space
weapons and sensor satellites would themselves become high-value targets
and vulnerable elements to attack.108 Thus, for BMD systems relying on wea-
pons or crucial sensors based in space, as Ashton Carter wrote in 1986, “ASAT
attack on these components is probably the cheapest and most effective of-
fensive countermeasure.”109 In practice, destroying a satellite is far simpler
than destroying a warhead carried on a reentry vehicle for several reasons.
Richard Garwin explained, “The satellite is far more fragile than is a nuclear
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108. See, e.g., Ashton Carter, “The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems,” inWeapons In
Space, Franklin Long et al., eds. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986); Bruce De-
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109. Ashton Carter, “The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems.”
Table 2: China’s Potential Passive Countermeasures against U.S. Missile Defense
Phase of Trajectory Countermeasures to Missile Defense
Boost • reducing the boost time by using fast-burn booster
• lofting or depressing the ICBM trajectories
• spoofing the defender’s tracking sensors
• changing the brightness and configuration of the exhaust plume
of an ICBM
• simultaneously launching several ICBMs (or with some theater or
tactical ballistic missiles) from a compact area
• protecting the missile body with reflective or ablative coatings (to
counter an SBL)
• rotating the missile (to counter an SBL)
Midcourse • using decoys and anti-simulation
• reducing the radar signature of the warhead
• reducing the infrared signature of the warhead
Terminal • making the high-velocity warhead maneuverable
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warhead equipped with reentry vehicle; the satellite follows a highly pre-
dictable trajectory; the satellite is considerably larger than a warhead; the in-
tercept time can be chosen, for the most part, at the convenience of the at-
tacker, and the attack can take place within a short range of ground-based
radars or laser systems to aid the attack.”110
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that China could resort to asymmet-
ric methods including ASAT weapons to counter critical and vulnerable space-
based components in LEO such as the SBI, SBL, and space-based tracking satel-
lites (e.g., SBI/ former SBIRS-low).
It should be noted that although China has some technological capabili-
ties that could potentially be used as ASAT weapons (as discussed below), this
does not mean China that has already developed ASATs or intends to do so.
Several recent editions of the U.S. Department of Defense annual report on
Chinese military power claim that China is developing and intends to deploy
ASAT weapons, including a direct-ascent ASAT system, ground-based laser
ASAT weapons, and microsatellites for use as weapons. However, there is no
evidence to support these claims.111 In practice, the pursuit of ASATs would be
politically damaging to China’s position on PAROS, which it has been actively
advocating since the development of SDI in the 1980s.112 In the context of a
deployed U.S. advanced missile defense system that includes space-based
weapons, it might become politically acceptable for China to pursue ASATs as
an effective countermeasure.
In what follows, I set aside political questions and examine Chinese tech-
nological capabilities that could potentially be used as ASAT weapons.
Over the past several decades, many types of ASAT weapons have been
proposed, especially within the United States and, until its dissolution, the
Soviet Union.113 ASAT weapons may be based on the ground, in the air, at sea,
or in space. They may be designed to destroy their target using a kinetic ener-
gy weapon (KEW), DEW, or an explosive charge, or disable their target tem-
porarily with devices such as jammers or other electronic or electro-optical
countermeasures or both. This paper defines ASAT weapons as devices de-
signed to destroy or permanently disable their targets.
Nuclear-armed ASATs. Ordinary nuclear weapons such as ICBMs and
SLBMs, when detonated in space, will kill nearby satellites via an electromag-
netic pulse. Any country—including China—with nuclear-armed long- or in-
termediate-range ballistic missiles has the capability to attack a satellite in
110. Richard Garwin, “Space Weapons or Space Arms Control.”
111. See, e.g., Jeffrey Lewis, “False Alarm on Foreign Capabilities”; see also Jeffrey Lewis’s
notes, “No Evidence To Back Up ASAT Claims in Chinese Military Power,” July 28, 2005,
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=707.
112. Du Xiangwan et al., “Banning Space Weapons—An Urgent Issue in Arms Control,”
China Report on Nuclear Science and Technology, CNIC-00401, Beijing, 1990.
113. T. H. Karas, M. Callaham, R. DalBello, and G. Epstein, Anti-satellite Weapons, Counter-
measures and Arms Control (Washington, DC: Office of Technology Assessment, 1985);
Ashton Carter, “Satellites and Anti-satellites,” International Security 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986).
LEO. With some modification, these weapons might also be capable of attack-
ing satellites at higher altitudes.
Nuclear weapons could also be concealed aboard satellites as nuclear
space mines, to be detonated on command when they are within lethal range
of quarry satellites. These nuclear ASATs could be as small and inexpensive as
many existing satellites and could be developed and tested covertly. More-
over, the operation of such ASATs would not require advanced satellite sur-
veillance systems. Thus, China could have these ASAT capabilities without
pursuing complicated technologies, and could feasibly use them to neutralize
the space-based components of a missile defense system in LEO.114 It should
be noted that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) prohibits the use of nuclear
ASATs. Moreover, the use of such weapons would damage not only the satel-
lites of China’s adversaries but also China’s own assets. Use of nuclear ASATs
seems unlikely except as a last resort in a nuclear conflict.
Kinetic-energy weapons. China might employ various types of KEWs, ground-
or space-based, to attack satellites. All would be relatively cheap and techni-
cally easy in comparison with a missile defense system.
The most optimal ASAT system for China would comprise ground-
launched small kinetic-kill vehicles, which destroy their targets by colliding
with them at extremely high velocities. These vehicles can reach a satellite in
LEO and, if mated with a larger booster, might be capable of reaching higher
orbits. Another easy and inexpensive ground-based ASAT would be a pellet
cloud delivered to LEO by a missile.115 Space mines with conventional charges
could also be used as space-based ASATs. All these kinetic energy ASATs are
within China’s technological capability.116
Effective non-nuclear ASATs require good space surveillance capabilities.
China’s satellite tracking system includes a domestic network, two foreign
sites, and four tracking ships. China has also delivered satellites into geosyn-
chronous orbit. As scientists have discussed, space-faring countries with the
ability to place objects in orbit or lift them to geosynchronous orbit should
also have the ability to closely track space objects and to develop homing
ASATs to attack satellites in both LEO and geosynchronous orbit.117
China should be able to use ground-launched small kinetic-kill vehicles,
pellet clouds, or space mines to attack SBI satellites. As Richard Garwin
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noted, “the same countermeasures would be even more cost-effective
against…the space-based laser, which would be larger and more vulnerable
than the interceptors.”118
High-energy laser weapons. High-energy laser (HEL) weapons are devices
that produce intense beams of electromagnetic radiation capable of damaging
a satellite permanently or, at lower power levels, jamming optical communi-
cation and sensor systems. HEL weapons can be ground-, space-, air-, or sea-
based. Since the 1980s, mainly encouraged by the U.S. Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative, many types of HEL weapons for ballistic missile defense or ASAT
purposes have been proposed, such as ground-based deuterium fluoride
chemical lasers and free-electron lasers (FEL); and space-based hydrogen fluo-
ride chemical lasers, and nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers.
Since the 1980s, China has made a great progress in research on and de-
velopment of HELs, perhaps prompted in part by the U.S. program on DEWs,
and partly funded under China’s “National 863” program for high-tech devel-
opment. However, not all HELs would have ASAT capabilities—solid and gas
lasers would not. Of HEL research in China, the technologies with potential
ASAT applications are the FEL and chemical oxygen-iodine laser. Given the ad-
vantage the United States has in space, it might be expected that if China pur-
sues HEL ASAT weapons, it would likely develop ground-based instead of
space-based systems.
China began to investigate the FEL in 1985.119 In May 1993, China activat-
ed its first FEL, the Shuguang-1 (“Dawn light”), developed by the Chinese
Academy of Engineering Physics.120 In September 1994, the academy used
Shuguang-1 to generate 140 MW of power at 34.4 GHz.121 FELs have a number
of advantages. They can operate at short wavelengths, which pass through at-
mospheric windows with higher quality beams for long distance propaga-
tion, and can probably be made to operate more efficiently than other short-
wavelength lasers. However, the size of FEL systems currently limits
deployment options. Chinese scientists are working to reduce the size of
these systems through the miniaturization of electronic devices.122
118. See Richard Garwin, “Holes in the Missile Shield.” The vulnerability of SBLs is also
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China’s HEL research and development could provide the technology
base for ground-based laser weapons to dazzle or permanently blind optical
sensors in space. At a higher power level, these weapons could damage satel-
lites. In practice, ground-based HELs would be simpler and more effective
means to destroy satellites than the lasers proposed for use as space-based
boost-phase missile defense. Moreover, the mass, volume, energy resources,
and efficiency requirements of ground-based lasers are far less restricted than
those of SBLs. In addition, although the opportunities for ground-based
lasers to attack satellites occur infrequently, they could shoot inexpensively
and repeatedly. To widen its field of attack, a ground-based HEL system could
use space-based reflectors to relay laser beams from the lasers to their targets.
However, HEL weapons would not operate through cloud cover, and
the effects of atmospheric turbulence would pose a serious problem. For a
ground-based weapons system, the use of adaptive mirrors must compensate
for atmospheric turbulence, with numerous electronic devices needed to
shape the optimal beam pattern. It was reported in the early 1990s that China
had made progress on the development of adaptive optics.123
High-powered microwave weapons. High-powered microwave (HPM)
weapons are devices capable of producing intense, damaging beams of radio
frequency radiation. At high power levels, they could be used to overload and
damage satellite electronic equipment, or, at lower power levels, merely to
overload satellite electronic systems temporarily (i.e., for jamming).
Chinese scientists from a number of organizations reportedly have en-
gaged in research, design, and testing of HPM devices.124 One of China’s first
experiments in HPM research was the Flash-I (Shanguang) system. After com-
pletion in 1983, the Flash-I operated at approximately 1 GHz and had a mi-
crowave power of 1 GW.125 However, it should be noted that HPM attacks
would only be practical from space.126 Thus, if China preferred to develop
ground-based directed energy ASATs as discussed above, HPM weapons would
not be a practical option.
Microsatellites. China is developing microsatellites for missions that in-
clude data transmission, Earth sensing, and other civilian programs.127 A joint
venture between China’s Tsinghua University and Great Britain’s University
of Surrey is building the “Tsinghua” system, a constellation of seven mi-
crosatellites with 50 m resolution remote-sensing payloads. China’s mi-
crosatellite program is mainly for civilian and commercial purposes including
communications and meteorological applications. As Philip Saunders and
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others noted, the technology “would potentially allow for lower-cost access
to space, enhanced maneuverability, and increased ability to launch-on-de-
mand.”128 However, these technologies could be also used for ASATs, as some
western scholars have noted.129 For example, the development of small satel-
lites would enable more rapid launching and allow launchers to be mobile—
important capabilities in a space-warfare environment. Moreover, these mi-
crosatellites could be hidden in other satellites and could covertly rendezvous
with other space assets to perform satellite inspection and other missions to
disrupt, degrade or destroy space assets.130
There is no evidence that China is developing microsatellites for ASAT
purposes. Both the 2003 and 2004 editions of the Pentagon’s “Annual Report
on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” cite a Hong Kong
newspaper (Xing Dao Daily) article of January 2001,131 stating that China has
“developed and tested an ASAT system described as a parasitic microsatel-
lite.”132 A parasitic microsatellite is a small satellite that attaches itself to larger
satellites to disrupt or destroy them on command. However, an examination
of the January 2001 newspaper story—the only source cited by the Pentagon
reports—by two experts at the Union of Concerned Scientists found that the
source of the story was an October 2000 story on a Chinese website of dubi-
ous repute.133 The original article, written by a self-described “military enthu-
siast,”134 casts doubt on the credibility of the story.
In summary, China could consider a variety of ASAT capabilities to count-
er a U.S. space-based weapon system. Furthermore, if China is to pursue
ASAT weapons, it is far more likely to develop ground-based ASAT weapons.
Compared with space-based weapons, ground-based ASATs would be easier
to control, cheaper to deploy, and, most important, less vulnerable to ad-
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Republic of China (July 28, 2003), p. 36, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chi-
naex.pdf; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (May 29, 2004), p. 42, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528
PRC.pdf.
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vanced space capabilities of the United States once they have deployed missile
defense and space weapons.
Reconsidering China’s Arms Control and Nonproliferation Commitments
According to Ambassador Sha Zukang, “China cannot afford to sit on its
hands without taking the necessary measures while its strategic interests are
being jeopardized. China, inter alia, may be forced to review the arms control
and non-proliferation policies it has adopted since the end of the Cold War in
light of new developments in the international situation.”135 In response to
perceived threats, China may be forced to withhold cooperation with respect
to the negotiation of a FMCT and to revaluate its self-restraint on nuclear test-
ing and other proliferation issues.
Participation in Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. A conservative estimate of
China’s existing stockpile suggests about two tons of weapons-grade highly
enriched uranium and one ton of separated plutonium.136 The existing stock-
pile would be sufficient for modernizing China’s nuclear forces under the as-
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See details: David Wright and Lisbeth Gronlund, “Estimating China’s Production of Plu-
tonium for Weapons,” Science &Global Security 11, no. 1 (2003). Estimates by Albright,
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Table 3: China’s Potential ASAT Measures
Weapon ASAT Capability China’s Technical Capacity
Ground-based
KEWs
Miniature homing vehicles or a
pellet cloud could destroy these
space-based weapons or sen-
sors at LEO.
China has the ability to launch
objects into orbit, and should be
able to develop homing ASATs.
ICBMs and
SLBMs
The current long- or intermedi-
ate-range nuclear missile can
destroy LEO satellites. With
some modifications, these
weapons might be used to
attack satellites at higher
altitudes.
Currently China has such capaci-
ties. However, the use of nuclear
ASATs would also destroy China’s
own satellites. This is banned by
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
Ground-based
HELs
HELs can damage a satellite
permanently or, at lower power
levels, can blind optical commu-
nication and sensor systems.
As reported, China began FEL re-
search and development in the
1980s, and in 1994 China’s
Shuguang-1 achieved a power of
140 MW. It could be used as a
jamming device, but no evidence
shows it was developed as a
weapons system.
Space-based
ASATs
A space mine can destroy a
nearby satellite when detonated
on command. Microsatellites
can also be used as ASATs.
Space mines could be within
Chinese technological capaci-
ties, and China is currently de-
veloping civilian microsatellites.
CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE WEAPONS 63
sumption that the U.S. does not deploy a missile defense system. However,
if U.S. missile defense deployments become operational, China would very
likely be driven to expand its ICBM arsenal significantly, as described above,
both in quantity and quality. In that case, China would deplete its existing fis-
sile material stockpile and might find it necessary to produce more fissile ma-
terial. China might then wish to keep open the option to restart production
of fissile materials and therefore be unwilling to join a global fissile material
cutoff treaty.137
In the 2000 white paper on China’s national defense, China cited its dual
concerns:
In view of the fact that the US is accelerating its efforts for the devel-
opment and possible deployment of a national missile defense system
and space weapons, and that the US and Russia still possess nuclear ar-
senals large enough to destroy the world many times over, it is China’s
position that continued nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an
arms race in outer space are multilateral fora of arms control that
should be given more priority than the FMCT negotiations. Therefore,
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should not emphasize the
importance of only the FMCT negotiations to the neglect of the issues
of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer
space, and should, at the minimum, give equal attention to all three is-
sues by carrying out its substantive work in a balanced manner.138
Negotiations on a universal FMCT, which would ban the production of
fissile material (separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and uranium-
233), are now in limbo. Negotiations at the CD in Geneva remain deadlocked,
due to recent U.S. plans regarding missile defense and space weaponization.
A primary goal of the FMCT will be to attain the signatures of the five de-
clared nuclear weapon states and three de facto nuclear weapon states (India,
Pakistan, and Israel). In practice, the FMCT does not have much effect on U.S.
and Russian stockpiles, because of their huge size. China’s participation in an
FMCT will be critical to its success, however. Without China’s participation,
9–13.5 tons of uranium. See details: David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker,
World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992 (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1993). However, these estimates are uncertain because little is known about
either the size of the Chinese arsenal or the amount of fissile material used in individual
Chinese weapons. Moreover, little is known about how much fissile material is lost during
weapons production or the recycling of fissile materials. To maintain a nuclear arsenal,
China would want to hold some material in reserve; the amount would depend on the size
of the arsenal China intends to build. Thus, in a conservative estimate, China’s stockpile of
fissile materials not in weapons is one ton or less of plutonium and two tons or less of
highly enriched uranium. Assuming one Chinese weapon contains about 5 kg of plutonium
or about 25 kg of highly enriched uranium, this stockpile could fuel about 300 new warheads.
137. See, e.g., Hui Zhang, “ A Chinese View on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,” Journal of
Nuclear Materials Management 30, no. 4 (2002); Hui Zhang, “FMCT and PAROS: A Chinese
Perspective,” INESAP Bulletin 20 (2002).
138. Information Office of the PRC State Council,White Paper on China’s National Defense
in 2000, October 16, 2000.
India will not sign the FMCT, and Pakistan will not sign unless India does.
Both South Asian countries and Israel are believed to be continuing produc-
tion of fissile materials for their stockpiles. China is believed to have stopped
the production of both highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons
in the early 1990s,139 and has consistently supported FMCT negotiations. In
March 1999, Chinese President Jiang Zemin appealed to the CD, “Negotia-
tions should be conducted as soon as possible for the conclusion of a univer-
sal and verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.”140 However, with growing
concern about U.S. missile defense and space control plans, China has clearly
expressed since 2000 that the space issue “is just as important as fissile materi-
al cut-off, if not more.”141 However, the United States opposes any negotia-
tion of the outer space issue. In response to the 2002 Chinese and Russian
Joint Working Paper on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Eric
M. Javits, the permanent representative of the United States to the CD, said,
“the United States sees no need for new outer space arms control agreements
and opposes the idea of negotiating a new outer space treaty.”142 The dis-
agreement between China and the United States over the FMCT and PAROS
negotiations for several years has prevented the CD from continuing any arms
control negotiations.
Aiming to break the deadlock at the CD and to promote the international
arms control and disarmament process, China in 2003 dropped its claims to
links between the FMCT and PAROS, and agreed to a negotiation of the FMCT.
However, given Beijing’s major concerns (as discussed above), it can be ex-
pected that U.S. missile defense and space weaponization plans will definitely
affect China’s willingness to participate in an FMCT negotiation. China main-
tains that the purposes and objectives of arms control and disarmament
“should serve to enhance the security of all countries; it should not become a
tool for stronger nations to control weaker ones, still less should it be an in-
strument for a handful of countries to optimize their armament in order to
seek unilateral security superiority.”143 In practice, China still firmly holds that
the prevention of space weaponization is an urgent issue.144
Nuclear test ban ratification. China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and has not yet ratified it, partly because the U. S. Sen-
ate rejected it in 1999. However, U.S. missile defense and space weaponiza-
tion plans make it politically difficult for China to consider ratification. The
cessation of nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions,
as called for in the CTBT, would constrain qualitative improvement of China’s
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existing nuclear weapons and the development of new advanced weapons. In
the event of a continuing challenge from the United States, China would
need further nuclear tests to avoid a major degradation or neutralization of
their limited retaliatory capability. For example, China may need additional
nuclear tests to reduce the size of new warheads as needed for deployment of
MIRVed missiles or complicated decoys. The development of maneuvering
warheads would also require tests.145
Already, some Chinese scientists and arms control experts believe that China
made significant sacrifices in signing the CTBT, arguing that the CTBT places
more direct constraints on China’s nuclear weapons program than on the
weapons programs of other states.146 However, to achieve the goal of com-
plete prohibition and eventual destruction of nuclear weapons, China decided
to sign the treaty despite its drawbacks. Many Chinese question why other
nations, including China, should care about an international agreement such as
the CTBT when the United States, in pursuing its own absolute security, damages
the security of other nations and expresses no interest in international treaties.
China’s concerns about missile defense and space weaponization could
also affect its efforts on other nuclear proliferation issues. For example,
though it has not yet done so, China could diminish its cooperation on the
Korean peninsula and on South Asian issues. Given that China and Russia
share a mutual concern about U.S. hegemony, both countries could seek clos-
er collaboration on military and strategic concerns, and on political opposi-
tion to the United States. For example, Russia and China could cooperate on
deploying military countermeasures to missile defense.
In summary, the development and deployment of U.S. missile defense sys-
tems, including weapons in space, would definitely encourage a number of re-
sponses from China including technological development, military counter-
measures, and political realignment. The type of response would depend on
the specific infrastructure of U.S. missile defense and space weaponization
programs. At the moment and in the near future, China’s major response
would be to take an arms control approach, such as firmly advocating at the
CD a legal instrument to prevent space weaponization. Facing very limited
missile defense deployment, e.g., the initial GMD currently under deployment,
China might focus on building more road-mobile ICBMs and developing a va-
riety of penetration aids. If a stronger missile defense system with more inter-
ceptors is deployed, China would need to produce more fissile material to fuel
more warheads, thus influencing its FMCT participation. If China is confront-
ed with the deployment of a layered (or space-based) missile defense system,
it could consider additional measures such as using ASAT weapons.
Consequently, the cumulative effect of U.S. space weaponization plans will
have grave adverse consequences for global security that will not benefit any
country’s security interests. As Ambassador Hu said, “In a nutshell, the
145. See, e.g., Li Bin, “The Effects of U.S. NMD on Chinese Strategy.”
146. See, e.g., Sun Xiangli, “The Implication of the CTBT for China’s Security,” CISAC
Working Paper, Stanford University, 1997; Zou Yunhua, “China and the CTBT Negotia-
tions,” CISAC Working Paper, Stanford University, 1998.
weaponization of outer space will be detrimental to the interests and security
of each and every State, including the very one that introduces weapons into
outer space. Its consequences will be most serious and in no one’s interest.”147
ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE
The United States has expressed concerns about the vulnerability of its exten-
sive assets in space. Technical measures—e.g., hardening satellite components
to protect them against certain types of attack or adding redundancy to satel-
lite systems—offer some mitigation of vulnerability. However, such measures
are unlikely to suffice in the absence of strengthened international agreements
on space activity. Hardening satellites would be very costly, even infeasible, in
particular for civilian and commercial satellites. These technical measures
would also impair the operational flexibility of satellites.
A number of U.S. analysts have suggested that it would be safer for the
United States to maintain outer space as a sanctuary free of strike weapons.148
China’s opposition to the deployment of weapons in space has been detailed
above. If the United States wants to reduce the potential vulnerability of its
space assets, there are a number of ways to do so. However, weaponizing
space can only worsen space security. As Chinese Ambassador Hu empha-
sized recently, “for ensuring security in outer space, political and legal ap-
proaches … can still be effective, while resorting to force and the develop-
ment of space weapons will only be counter-productive.”149
In this section, I examine a number of measures that would protect the
broad range of scientific, commercial, and military activities in space, and
begin to satisfy both China’s concerns and those of the United States. What
“rules of the road” might help to prevent misunderstandings and the inadver-
tent escalation of conflict in space? How might existing treaties governing
the use of space be amended? What kinds of comprehensive agreements are
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worth discussing? In the context of a comprehensive agreement, what missile
defense and space deployments would need to be prohibited?
Partial Arms Control Measures
Several measures on arms control in space—to protect space assets and pre-
vent space weaponization—have been proposed recently. These include both
partial and comprehensive arms control measures. Although many parties see
broad arms control measures as the final goal, some analysts suggest that it
would be more realistic to take a step-by-step approach, working from some
partial measure towards more comprehensive measures.
A number of partial measures for space arms control have been proposed.
These include:
• a ban on testing or use of any kind of ASAT weapons;
• a set of measures proposed by Clay Moltz prohibiting the use or testing of
ASATs; prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any sort in LEO; allowing
permitted testing of ground-based, sea-based, and air-based interceptors
in LEO against ballistic missiles passing through space; and permitting the
deployment of a non-space-based missile defense system;150
• a declaration not be the first to deploy weapons in space or to further
test destructive antisatellite weapons;151
• a prohibition of the use of weapons above a certain latitude (perhaps
5000 km) to protect higher-altitude satellites; and
• an agreement to protect manned missions but prohibit manned military
space operations.
A number of these measures could be secured by unilateral means and
multilateral rules or agreements. Space-faring countries could also adopt a
set of rules to ensure the safety of space operations. These “rules of the road”
would be intended to reduce suspicion and encourage the orderly use of
space. One model for a set of such rules might be the Soviet-American 1972
Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, which
has been widely replicated. Similar sets of rules for space have been discussed
in the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer-Space in Vienna for some
time. Most recently, the Stimson Center proposed a code of conduct for the
prevention of incidents and dangerous military practices in space.152
Specific rules for the use of space might include:
• “keep-out zones,” i.e., agreed upon limits on minimum physical separa-
tion distance between orbiting satellites;
150. James Clay Moltz, “Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control,” Arms Control
Today (April 2002).
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www.stimson.org/pub.cfm? id=81.
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• restrictions on very low-altitude fly-overs by manned or unmanned
spacecraft;
• a non-interference rule for satellites, enlarging upon examples provided
in the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks that prohibited in-
terference with any national technical means of verification;
• stronger international cooperation on reducing space debris—in partic-
ular, clearer definitions of intentional and unintentional acts of debris
creation;
• notification of space launch activities including pre-and post-launch in-
formation, and details about ballistic missiles in space launch, test
flights and real launches (these rules could build upon the example of
the U.S.-Russia Joint Data-Exchange Center);
• development of safer traffic management procedures; and
• other “confidence-building measures” such as hotlines between major
missile and space powers.
It should be noted that although the above rules would reduce present
risks, they would not by themselves remove the threat of ASAT attacks. For
example, a rule on “keep-out-zones” would not prohibit an attack by an SBL
at long distance. In short, with no control or limit on space weaponization,
these rules could not completely secure space assets.
If a step-by-step approach to arms control and space security is taken, any
multilateral attempt must consider all countries’ interests. One of China’s pri-
mary motivations for a ban on space weaponization is its concern about U.S.
missile defense plans, which, as discussed, might negate China’s current capa-
bilities for nuclear deterrence. Thus, any partial arms control measure involv-
ing China should emphasize this concern. For example, a proposal that re-
stricted ASATs but allowed the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system
would be perceived by China as discriminatory for two reasons. First, ASATs
would be an effective way for China to counter the threat posed by U.S. mis-
sile defense. Second, it is difficult to distinguish between ABM systems and
ASATs, which possibly would create a source of tension.
A Treaty Banning Space Weapons?
In China’s view, the most effective way to secure space assets would be a
ban on space weaponization. Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi stated, “If any
country is really worried about possible menace to its space interests, this
could certainly be alleviated through the negotiation and conclusion of a
treaty on the prevention of space weaponization, as suggested by China…
Such a legally binding international treaty will be the best tool to safeguard
the interests of all sides.”153
The U.S. position has been that an additional treaty to regulate the use of
space is unnecessary. It is true that there are several treaties limiting certain
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space-based military activities, and these have helped to curb an arms race in
space. However, there is no treaty to prohibit testing or deployment and use
of weapons in outer space, other than weapons of mass destruction.154 For
example, the 1967 OST, now involving 120 states, bans nuclear weapons or
any other weapons of mass destruction in space or on the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, but does not ban weapons in general. The 1963 Limited Test-
Ban Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty prohibited nuclear
test explosions in space. The 1979 Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II)
banned the development, testing, and deployment of systems for placing nu-
clear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction, including fractional
orbital missiles, into Earth orbit. The 1972 ABM treaty prohibited the develop-
ment, testing, or deployment of space-based missile defense systems or com-
ponents. Until the United States’ withdrawal, the ABM treaty had been one of
the most important agreements on the prevention of space weaponization. It
remains apparent that, with or without the ABM treaty, existing treaties are
not sufficient to restrict the weaponization of outer space. Moreover, another
major loophole is the absence of any agreed upon ban on the threat or use of
force from Earth (including from land, sea or air) against outer space objects.155
In recent years, most countries have supported efforts to negotiate a new
treaty on PAROS. The UN General Assembly has consistently adopted a resolu-
tion against space weaponization by an overwhelming majority. In 1999, for
example, almost 140 nations voted for such a resolution; only the United
States and Israel abstained. The negotiation and adoption of an international
agreement on PAROS remains a top priority of the CD, and a number of na-
tions, including China, Russia, Canada, and the Group of 21, have presented
proposals on PAROS.
Some U.S. participants in the CD argue that because there is at present no
arms race in space, there is therefore no need to develop international treaties to
prevent it. In 2002, John Bolton, then U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation, stated to the CD, “The current international re-
gime regulating the use of space meets all our purposes.We see no need for
new agreements.”156 Yet, as Richard Garwin noted, “The best time to introduce
such treaties and regulations is when there is not active conflict or even an ap-
proach to conflict in space.”157 The dispute over space weaponization has para-
lyzed the CD, rendering it unable to advance any arms control negotiations.
Some experts suggest that amending the 1967 OST would be more expedi-
ent than negotiating a new treaty. George Bunn and John Rhinelander, legal
advisers to previous U.S. administrations, argued that the OST created an
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“overall rule [that] space shall be preserved for peaceful purposes for all coun-
tries.”158 By their logic, member nations may use this interpretation of the
treaty to prevent unwanted activities by other member nations. As Rhine-
lander and Bunn explained, “If a state decided to test and possibly orbit in
space an anti-satellite weapon…utilizing a laser or kinetic kill vehicle, other
state-parties to the space treaty could request consultations. They could con-
clude that the treaty prohibits the orbiting of the proposed ASAT… Space
testing or deployment of other future strike weapons that are inconsistent
with ‘the benefit and in the interests of all countries’…might produce a simi-
lar interpretation.”159 Amending the OST bypasses the negotiation and ap-
proval of a new treaty by the Senate, and, as Rhinelander and Bunn noted,
also avoids the need for unanimity among parties to the treaty.
Opposing experts argue that the OST is now outmoded and should be
abandoned, as it was written before significant recent advances in technology,
and relies on vague terms such as “outer space” and “peaceful purposes” that
now need clarification.160 Some Chinese are also concerned that opting to
amend the OST instead of drawing a new treaty neglects the urgency of ad-
dressing space weaponization. Thus, they believe a better approach—one
that would also strengthen the OST—is to prepare a new treaty.
Broad vs. Focused Approaches to Arms Control in Space
Many Chinese believe that China should pursue a complete ban on any kind
of space weapons system to effectively prevent space weaponization. China’s
stance on this issue has been consistent since 1985, when it first introduced a
working paper to the CD describing its position on space weapons.161 China’s
most recent working paper on the issue, introduced in June 2002, empha-
sized three basic obligations: 1) “Not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial
bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner”; 2)
“Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects”; and 3)
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“Not to assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international organ-
izations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.”162
In order to advance the CD work on PAROS, China (with Russia) prepared
two “non-papers” in August 2004 on “verification aspects of PAROS” and “ex-
isting international legal instruments and the prevention of the weaponization
of outer space.”163 The non-paper on verification argues that the verification
regime of a future outer space treaty will be highly complex and will encounter
great technological and financial challenges. The non-paper cited the 1967 OST
to show that even without a verification mechanism, the treaty is still effective,
and therefore, for the time being, a legal instrument for outer space can be for-
mulated without a verification mechanism.164 However, it does not exclude
the addition of a verification protocol when conditions are ripe. The proposal
attempts to bypass the problem of verification so that it does not become the
principal obstacle to the urgently needed work on PAROS. The non-paper on
existing international legal instruments emphasizes that there are no existing
treaties that effectively prevent the testing, deployment, and use of weapons
other than those of mass destruction in outer space. In addition, none of these
instruments covers the threat or use of force from the Earth (including the
land, the sea, and the atmosphere) against objects in outer space.
The interpretation of the scope or definition of “space weapon” will be of
crucial importance in any future negotiation of a space weapons ban. It will
not only affect China’s judgment on the value of the ban, but also U.S. deci-
sions on missile defense systems. There is at present no consensus on what
constitutes a space weapon. Chinese documents define space weapons as:
1) any weapon stationed in outer space for the purpose of attacking objects in
space, on the ground, in the air, or at sea; and 2) any space-, ground-, air-, or
sea-based weapons that target objects in outer space.
Two key issues in defining the scope of space weaponry are where weapons
are based and what constitutes an “object in outer space.” On the first ques-
tion, any weapon stationed in outer space should be classified as a space wea-
pon. This interpretation is likely to be widely accepted, as the issue of space
basing is key. For the question of what constitutes an object in outer space, if
“the object” refers only to satellites, then the space weapons ban applies to any
weapons stationed in outer space (as answered by the first question) and any
ASAT weapons, regardless of location. I refer to this approach defining space
weapons as focused. However, if “the object” refers not only to satellites but
also to missiles traveling through space, then space weapons would be defined
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as any space-based weapons, any ASAT weapons, and any ABM weapons inter-
cepting missiles in outer space. I refer to this as a broad approach to defining
space weapons. By definition, the focused approach would permit a non-space-
based BMD system, while prohibiting space-based BMD system. In contrast, the
broad approach would put a strong limit any mid-course missile defense sys-
tem, such as the one currently being developed and deployed by the United
States. Although the official Chinese documents do not yet further clarify
whether “object in outer space” would exclude ICBMs traveling in outer space,
authoritative publications in China have generally favored a broad approach to
the definition of space weapons.165
To fully define space weapons, one also needs to define the boundary of
outer space. There is currently no internationally accepted definition of the
outer space boundary. China has defined the boundary of outer space as the
Earth’s atmosphere, i.e., all space beyond 100 km above the sea level of the
Earth. Most scientists and experts generally support the definition of the
boundary between 100 to 110 km.166 The difference between 100 km and 110
km is not a significant concern, because all space-based weapons or “objects
in space” discussed below are at much higher altitudes than 110 km.
A broad space weapons ban. An examination of missile defense systems il-
lustrates the importance to any treaty negotiation of unambiguously defining
the term “objects of outer space.” In the case of a ban on space weapons de-
fined broadly, all potential space-based missile defense systems, including
space-based, boost-phase systems, would be banned. These space-based mis-
sile defense weapons would be typically deployed in polar or near-polar or-
bits much higher than 100 km. For example, the envisioned SBL weapons
would orbit at around 1000 km or higher. Space-based KEWs would orbit at
an altitude of about 300–500 km.167
The GMD system that is currently deployed would not be permitted under a
broad definition, as the intercept altitude of ballistic missile defense is between
about 200 km and 2000 km (a typical intercept altitude for a ICBM at range of
10,000 km is between about 1000 and 1500 km). It is reported that the actual
national missile defense system will intercept at an approximate altitude of 1100
km and that the minimum intercept altitude of BMD is 130 km. Both would ex-
ceed the 100 km limit set by a broad interpretation of space weapons.168 In ad-
dition, theater missile defense systems, such as THAAD and sea-based midcourse
defense systems, are designed for exoatmospheric intercept.169
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Moreover, even the proposed ground-based boost-phase missile defense
system would intercept an ICBM at an altitude over 100 km.170 For example, if
the burnout time of an ICBM is between 200 and 250 seconds, and its burnout
altitude is between 200 and 350 km, an interceptor (of 100 seconds burn-time,
8.5 km/s burnout speed, launched approximately 100 seconds after ICBM
launch) within 1000 km of the ICBM launch location would intercept the
ICBM at an altitude of approximately 200 km.171
The only missile defense system allowed under a broad space weapons
ban would be the terminal-phase defense system, which would destroy war-
heads at low altitudes (tens of kilometers) through the use of a non-space-
based antimissile weapon. However, the defense footprint of this system is
small in comparison to other systems, as it is only a “point” defense for a lo-
calized area such as a missile silo. Without other overlapping systems, it
would not provide global coverage.
Because a broad interpretation of space weapons would rule out almost
all U.S. missile defense systems, Chinese officials who want to limit U.S. mis-
sile defense deployments would advocate a ban that used this interpretation.
For the same reason, it is unlikely that the United States would accept such
an interpretation. Many Chinese officials and experts have already used the
broad definition of space weapons.172
A focused space weapons ban. If China wants to move past its complaints
and toward an agreement, it will have to consider proposals that might con-
ceivably be acceptable to the United States. A ban on space weapons that
used a focused definition of these weapons, along with bilateral confidence-
building measures, could be a first practical step to overcome the deadlock at
the CD and to reduce the concerns of both the U.S. and China. The focused
approach could include the following two core elements:
• Banning the testing and deployment of any weapons in outer space,
including space-based KEWs, space-based DEWs, and any other space-
based weapons for attacking space-, ground-, sea-, or air-based targets.
This would rule out space-weapon components of missile defense and
ASAT systems.
• Banning the testing and deployment of any “dedicated” ASAT weapons.
This would include any weapon strike system—whether ground-based,
sea-based, air-based, or space-based—against orbiting satellites.
170. Theodore Postol, transcript of, “A Preliminary Analysis of a Russian-US Boost-phase
Defense to Defend Russia and the U.S. from Postulated Rogue-State ICBMs,” presentation
at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 12, 1999; Richard Garwin,
“Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative,” Arms Control Today (September 2000); Re-
port of the APS Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense.
171. Theodore Postol, “A Preliminary Analysis of a Russian-US Boost-phase Defense.”
172. See, e.g., Wang Xiaoyu, “Development of Antiballistic Missile System vs. the Preven-
tion of an Arms Race in Outer Space”; Du Xiangwan, Science and Technology Foundation For
Nuclear Arms Control; Liu Huaqiu, ed., Arms Control and Disarmament Handbook.
Because all long- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles and high-altitude
missile defense systems have inherent ASAT capabilities, it would not be prac-
tical to pursue a complete ban on ASATs. Although a ban on testing in “ASAT
mode” would not eliminate all threats to satellites, it would reduce the cost
and complexity of ensuring a reasonable level of satellite safety. Under such a
regime, non-dedicated ASATs would not be able to reach high-value satellites
in geosynchronous or high Earth orbit, including widely used weather satel-
lites and civilian and military communications satellites, and some of the
most stabilizing and defensive military satellites responsible for early warn-
ings of missile launches and the detection of nuclear explosions.
What is the likelihood of both the United States and China considering a
focused approach to banning space weapons?
The United States would likely find a focused approach more acceptable
than a broad approach. Although a focused approach would ban space-based
weapons and ASATs, it would allow deployment of the GMD system that is a
major part of the MDA’s current budget and development efforts.
A focused space weapons ban would reduce the proliferation of ASATs. It
would reduce the risk of a “Space Pearl Harbor” for other military and civil-
ian satellites. As many experts in the United States point out, the heavy de-
pendence of the United States on its space assets means that it “has more to
lose than to gain by opening the way to the testing and deployment of ASATs
and space weapons.”173 For example, the United States is now more depend-
ent on satellites to perform important military functions than is any other
state. By placing weapons in space, the United States might stimulate others
to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against U.S. space assets. It
would be very difficult for the United States to maintain unchallenged hege-
mony in space weaponization, and many have argued that the United States’
current military advantage in space assets would be lost or degraded by wea-
ponization. Space weaponization would also threaten U.S. civilian and com-
mercial assets. The economy and society of the United States are highly de-
pendent on the applications of commercial satellites. Placing weapons in
space would make these satellites much more vulnerable.
Richard Garwin and his co-authors argue that “a regime that effectively
prohibits the deployment of space weapons and the use of destructive ASAT
before they can destroy U.S. or other satellites would be a smart, hard-nosed
investment in U.S. national security, but would require U.S. leadership.”174
Although funding requests from the current administration show continued
interest in space-based weapons systems, the actual level of funding is direct-
ed toward only a small portion of the missile defense program, which re-
mains in the conceptual and research stages. At the current speed of develop-
ment, the space-based BMD system would not reach fruition until around
2020. The United States still has time for serious reconsideration of its space
activities.
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From a Chinese perspective, a non-space-based BMD system would be
less threatening to national security than a space-based missile defense sys-
tem. As discussed above, countermeasures for mid-course missile defense sys-
tems would be less expensive and easier for China to develop. However, a
space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would pose more threat than
a non-space-based BMD system, because a boost-phase missile defense would
have fewer targets, the target ICBM would be much larger and more fragile
than the normal re-entry vehicle, and the target would be easily detectable
due to the bright plumes of the burning booster. Moreover, a non-space-
based, boost-phase missile defense system would not be able to cover ICBMs
launched from China’s interior. In fact, an ICBM at an altitude of 200 km is
only detected within 1600 km by a sensor on the ground, and within 2000
km by a sensor at an altitude of 15 km. Because of the vastness of China’s land
holdings, the United States would have to destroy a Chinese missile in boost
phase from space.175 As such, even a limited ban on space weapons would sig-
nificantly reduce the threat to China posed by U.S. missile defense systems,
assuming that Chinese military planners have confidence in countermeasures
for midcourse missile defense systems.
Other confidence building measures. Other bilateral confidence-building
measures between the United States and China would facilitate China’s con-
sideration of a focused approach to space weapons negotiations. These meas-
ures might include:
• U.S. acknowledgment of the serious nature of China’s concerns, includ-
ing an assurance that a U.S. missile defense system will not target
China.
• A U.S. pledge to adopt a bilateral no-first-use policy toward China. Be-
cause China already has a blanket no-first-use policy on nuclear
weapons, many Chinese believe that a U.S. no-first-use policy would
significantly reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. Such a policy would
ease concerns about the possibility of a U.S. pre-emptive strike.
• The clear exclusion of Taiwan in the U.S.-Japan joint theater missile de-
fense plan, and prohibition of the sale of theater missile defense to Tai-
wan. This measure would greatly reduce China’s concerns about region-
al security and security in Taiwan.
• Additional limitations on the scale and scope of the envisioned U.S.
non-space-based missile defense architecture. This would include plac-
ing a limit on the number of missile defense interceptors and restricting
the system to the minimum required to deal with rogue threats. This
would ensure that China’s current stock of fissile materials would be
sufficient to fill the number of new warheads needed to balance U.S.
missile defense interceptors. Without any limitations on missile defense
systems, China harbors concerns about whether its current fissile mate-
rial stocks are sufficient to counter a larger U.S. missile defense system.
175. Richard Garwin, “Holes in the Missile Shield”; American Physical Society, Report of the
APS Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense.
Not only does this directly affect China’s willingness to participate in
the FMCT, but it also ensures that China builds its nuclear arsenal in a
predictable way—until it has the capacity to meet the threat of a U.S.
missile defense system—which the United States should acknowledge
and understand.
• The development of a cooperative early warning system between the
United States and China, much like the current U.S.-Russian early
warning system.
CONCLUSIONS
There is evidence to suggest that the Bush administration’s move toward
space weaponization is gaining momentum. A number of U.S. military plan-
ning documents issued in recent years reveal the intention to control space by
military means. In practice, the United States is pursuing several space wea-
pons programs that could be used to attack ballistic missiles in flight and also
satellites and targets anywhere on Earth. Chinese officials have expressed a
growing concern that U.S. space control plans would stimulate a costly and
destabilizing arms race in space and on Earth. In particular, Beijing is con-
cerned that the United States seeks to neutralize China’s strategic nuclear de-
terrence capabilities, freeing itself to intervene in China’s affairs and under-
mine efforts at reunification with Taiwan.
To respond to the move by the United States to deploy space weapons,
the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to
prevent space weaponization, as it now advocates. A feasible, focused agree-
ment would ban the deployment of weapons in space and the testing of
weapons in ASAT mode. If this effort fails and if the security threats China
perceives to be legitimate are ignored, China would likely develop responses
to neutralize these threats. Possible responses might include building more
ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against missile defenses, developing ASAT
weapons, and reconsidering China’s commitments to arms control including
participation in the FMCT and ratification of the CTBT. Failure to proceed
with the nuclear disarmament process eventually would undermine the al-
ready fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime. Consequently, U.S. space
weaponization plans would have potentially disastrous effects on internation-
al security and the peaceful use of outer space. This would not benefit any
country’s security interests.
If Washington wants to reduce the potential vulnerability of its space as-
sets, there are a number of ways to improve space security, including satellite
hardening, accepting modest “rules of the road,” and agreeing to more com-
prehensive arms control measures. Weaponizing space can only erode space
security, which is in no one’s interest. China believes that the most effective
way to secure space assets is to agree to an international ban on space wea-
ponization. In recent years, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions
calling for the CD to start a negotiation on PAROS by an overwhelming major-
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ity. Washington has opposed these resolutions. If the history of nuclear wea-
pons tells us anything, it is that banning the testing and deployment of
weapons from the outset is much more effective than attempting disarma-
ment and non-proliferation after the fact.
Outer space is the common property of mankind. The international com-
munity should take action now to prevent a space arms race and to ensure the
continued peaceful use of outer space.
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